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Arming the Second Amendment—
and Enforcing the Fourteenth
William D. Araiza *
Abstract
This Article considers the timely and important question of
Congress’s power to enforce the Second Amendment. Such
legislation would test the Court’s current enforcement power
doctrine, which ostensibly acknowledges a congressional role in
vindicating constitutional rights while insisting on judicial
supremacy in stating constitutional meaning. Second Amendment
doctrine is complex and, importantly, methodologically varied.
That complexity and variety would require the Court to perform a
more nuanced, granular approach to the enforcement power than
it has thus far in the modern era.
Part II quickly recaps the Court’s Enforcement Clause
jurisprudence. It concludes that its most recent enforcement power
cases have left the doctrine adrift. Part III provides a similarly
quick recap of the Supreme Court’s and lower federal courts’
Second Amendment jurisprudence. It identifies at least five steps
that courts have taken in analyzing Second Amendment issues,
which reflect varying levels of core constitutional meaning. That
variation matters for the constitutionality of particular instances
of congressional gun rights enforcement.
Part IV examines, and finds wanting, the extant approaches
to congruence and proportionality review as they might apply to
Second Amendment enforcement legislation. Part V offers an
alternative approach, in which review of gun rights enforcement
legislation would account for the different constitutional status of
each step of Second Amendment doctrine. Part VI applies this
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to Joseph Blocher,
Brannon Denning, Lawrence Rosenthal, Eugene Volokh, and participants at the
Loyola University School of Law Constitutional Law Colloquium for comments
on an earlier draft of this Article. Thanks also to Mark Potkewitz for fine
research assistance.
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approach, and works through its difficulties, using a hypothetical
enforcement statute granting Americans the right to carry
firearms in their automobiles.
Part VII briefly and speculatively expands the scope of this
proposed approach to legislation enforcing other substantive
Fourteenth Amendment rights. The difficulties posed by Second
Amendment enforcement legislation would likely reappear in
legislation enforcing such rights. It urges the Court to adopt an
approach of this sort in order to credibly implement both its
insistence on judicial supremacy in stating constitutional meaning
and its acknowledgement of Congress’s role in vindicating
constitutional rights.
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I. Introduction
When in 2008 the Supreme Court concluded that the Second
Amendment bestowed a personal right to “keep and bear arms,” 1
and when two years later it concluded that that right applied in
full to states via either the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
or Privileges and Immunities Clauses, 2 the Court embarked on a
new doctrinal voyage. 3 One of the more interesting, but less
remarked-upon, aspects of that voyage concerns the breadth of

1. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (“There
seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second
Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.”).
2. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (“[A]
provision of the Bill of Rights that protects a right that is
fundamental . . . applies equally to the Federal Government and the States. We
therefore hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.” (citation
omitted)).
3. Many scholars have commented on the implications of the novelty of
the gun possession right that the Court found in Heller. See, e.g., Eugene
Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An
Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1478–81
(2009) (noting that the Heller test and definition used in Heller to determine
what is excluded from the term “arms” has unclear implications in its
applicability); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1553
(2009) (arguing that “Heller’s greatest irony is that the mistakes and flaws of
the opinion end up improving the decision”); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of
Second Amendment Originalism and the Constitutional Case for Gun Control,
92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1187, 1191 (2015) (“This Article takes Heller’s conclusions
about the original meaning of the Second Amendment as given and assesses
whether they have produced—or even are capable of producing—an
authentically originalist Second Amendment jurisprudence.”).
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congressional power to enforce that right against states via the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause. 4
The question of Congress’s power to enforce the Second
Amendment has both a practical and doctrinal significance as
well as a broader and more theoretical import. With regard to the
former, it is relatively easy to envision a scenario in which
Congress might wish to use its enforcement power in the gun
rights context. Politically, the Second Amendment right is a
popular one in many parts of the country (and, to be more
granular, in many parts of many states), yet many states and
localities still enact strong gun control measures. 5 The resulting
regulatory patchwork provides an attractive target for political
forces that would prefer more robust gun possession rights at a
broader (particularly national) level. 6 At the same time, the
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this [amendment].”).
Indeed, this Article appears to be the first in-depth treatment of this issue since
the Court adopted the individual rights understanding of the Second
Amendment in Heller. Cf. Brannon Denning, Gun Shy: The Second Amendment
as an “Underenforced Constitutional Norm,” 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 719,
754, 762 (1998) (considering the possibilities of congressional enforcement of the
Second Amendment under the then-recently-decided case of City of Boerne v.
Flores).
5. For example, in the November 2016 elections, voters in California,
Nevada, and Washington enacted gun control measures. The Nevada measure
dealt with background checks. See THE BACKGROUND CHECK INITIATIVE, at 1
(2014), http://nvsos.gov/sos/home/showdocument?id=3440 (displaying Nevada’s
laws on background checks). The Washington initiative restricted gun access for
potentially dangerous persons. See INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. 1491, at 1 (2016),
https://sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/initiatives/Final Text_1016.pdf (“This act is
designed to temporarily prevent individuals who are at high risk of harming
themselves or other from accessing firearms . . . .”). While the California
measure enacted an array of limitations and requirements related to gun
possession. See TEXT OF PROPOSED LAW, PROPOSITION 51, at 1
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2016/general/en/pdf/text-proposed-laws.pdf#prop63
(“This initiative measure is submitted to the people in accordance with the
provisions of Section 8 of Article II of the California Constitution.”). Maine
voters rejected a proposal to impose background checks on certain types of gun
transactions. See AN ACT TO REQUIRE BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR GUN SALES, at 4,
http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/citizens/background.pdf (summarizing the
rejected proposal).
6. This patchwork, and the seemingly conflicting preferences of different
parts of the country, also raises the question of whether such local preferences
can be accommodated under Second Amendment doctrine. See Joseph Blocher,
Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 107 (2013) (arguing for such
accommodation). In turn, the doctrine’s ability to accommodate different gun
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tragic reality of continued mass shootings will spur continued
pushes for gun control legislation, especially at the state and local
level where such efforts are more likely to succeed. At the
national level, the emergence of control of the political branches
by a party committed to robust protection of guns rights makes it
likely, or at the very least plausible, that federal legislative
initiatives protecting such rights will emerge, especially when
states and localities are seen as infringing them.
From a doctrinal perspective, the Second Amendment
provides an interesting enforcement power case study for the
simple reason that the Enforcement Clause likely provides the
most attractive constitutional foundation for federal gun rights
legislation. Indeed, the enforcement power is almost tailor-made
for legislation protecting gun possession, given the Court’s
holding in United States v. Lopez 7 that simple possession of a gun
in a school zone is not conduct regulable under the commerce
power. 8
regulation regimes raises the subsequent question about whether such
flexibility militates against federal enforcement legislation enacting a single
national rule governing the relevant gun regulation issue.
7. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
8. See id. at 551 (holding that the Gun-Free Zones Act of 1990 exceeds the
authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause because “[t]he Act neither
regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession
be connected in any way to interstate commerce”). This fact also means that the
enforcement power would play a role greater than simply providing a
constitutional foundation for particular federal legislative remedies, in
particular, damages remedies, which are unavailable when Congress regulates
pursuant to its most important Article I powers. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that the Indian and Interstate
Commerce Clauses do not allow Congress to impose retrospective remedies on
non-consenting states); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll.
Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999) (“Seminole Tribe makes clear that
Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I
powers . . . .”); but see Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 375 n.12
(2006) (carving out an exception for Congress’s Article I authority to enact
bankruptcy laws). By contrast, the fact that the federal commerce power does
not extend to regulating gun possession, whatever the remedies Congress
chooses to authorize, makes the enforcement power crucial not just for purposes
of the availability of certain remedies, but for the potential for federal regulation
of any sort. To be sure, Congress might invoke its Article I Spending Clause
power when regulating how states deal with gun possession. But even this
power has come under new scrutiny. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519, 580 (2012) (finding that Congress exceeded its Spending Clause
power when it conditioned Medicaid grants to the states upon a state’s
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The Second Amendment enforcement issue is also interesting
for deeper and broader reasons. The first concerns methodology.
The Supreme Court has insisted that the Second Amendment
right is most appropriately identified by a historically-based
original understanding of that right, rather than what Justice
Scalia, writing for the Court in District of Columbia v. Heller, 9
derided as “interest balancing.” 10 This insistence that Second
Amendment questions be decided based on originalist
methodology—a methodology that Justice Scalia himself
described as reflecting an understanding of the Constitution as
“in its nature the sort of ‘law’ that is the business of the
courts” 11—raises important questions about the appropriate role
acceptance of the Affordable Care Act’s expansion of the Medicaid program).
The late Calvin Massey argued that the scope of the enforcement power
should turn in part on whether the enforcement legislation in question made
retrospective relief such as damages available. See Calvin Massey, Two Zones of
Prophylaxis: The Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Power, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 8 (2007) (“When Congress seeks to prevent possible
constitutional wrongs by enabling injured private parties to bring suit for
damages, however, the meaning of congruence and proportionality becomes
contested.”). In most enforcement power cases—for example, those dealing with
legislation regulating state government employment discrimination—the stakes
focus on the availability of retrospective relief, given the availability of the
commerce power as a source for federal regulation of states as long as that
regulation does not include a private right of action for damages. See Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555–56 (1985) (reasoning that
Congress’s actions in providing San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
employees “the protections of the wage and hour provisions of the FLSA
contravened no affirmative limit on Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause”); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72 (“Even when the Constitution vests in
Congress complete law-making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh
Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties
against unconsenting States.”). The stakes are higher in the narrower gun
context because the commerce power is unavailable to justify even that more
limited federal regulation. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (“To uphold the
Government’s contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference
in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power . . . .”). The fact that federal
enforcement of gun possession rights might have to rely fully on the
enforcement power, as opposed to partially on the commerce power, would raise
an additional complexity for the enforcement power if Professor Massey was
correct that the analysis turns in part on the remedy Congress sought to impose.
This Article brackets this important question.
9. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
10. Id. at 635.
11. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849,
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of Congress in contributing to that understanding. Simply put,
what constitutes “appropriate” 12 enforcement legislation when
the rights Congress seeks to enforce are revealed through an
analysis that is largely the work of judges? Indeed, what is
Congress’s role when those rights are identified through
originalist analysis that purports to uncover core constitutional
meaning, 13 rather than judicial doctrine that reflects doctrinal
heuristics that are chosen largely because of their judicial
manageability? 14
This theoretical question may soon have significant practical
implications that encompass, but also go beyond, the Second
Amendment. One striking aspect of the Court’s modern
Enforcement Clause jurisprudence has been its recent focus on
challenges to legislation enforcing the Equal Protection Clause,
rather than the Due Process Clause. Since the first two cases
decided under the modern “congruence and proportionality”
standard, both handed down nearly twenty years ago, 15 the Court
has decided only one significant Enforcement Clause case
involving enforcement of substantive rights. 16 The Court’s focus
854 (1989). Indeed, Justice Scalia went on to suggest that underlying the
principle of judicial review is “the perception that the Constitution . . . is in its
nature the sort of ‘law’ that is the business of the courts—an enactment that has
a fixed meaning that is ascertainable through the usual devices familiar to those
learned in the law.” Id. (emphasis added).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
13. See, e.g., Robert Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword:
Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Courts, Culture, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV.
4, 32 (2003) (“Scalia advocates originalism as a philosophy of constitutional
interpretation because . . . it emphasizes that the ‘interpretation of the
Constitution . . . is . . . essentially lawyers’ work . . . .’” (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA,
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 46 (1997))).
14. Cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2716 (2013) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (“The modern tiers of scrutiny . . . are a heuristic to help judges
determine when classifications have that ‘fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation’ [required by equal protection].” (quoting Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
15. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (creating a
congruence and proportionality test to determine whether Congress has acted
with proper authority and applying it to legislation enforcing the Free Exercise
Clause); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 652 (1999) (applying the congruence and proportionality test to a
statute defended as enforcing property rights in patents against state infringing
conduct).
16. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004) (finding that Title
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on equality-enforcing legislation has led to an enforcement power
jurisprudence that has turned heavily on the level, or tier, of
judicial protection enjoyed by the equality right Congress is
seeking to vindicate. 17 Because the Court has determined the
level of scrutiny by sometimes-explicit invocations of the culture’s
evolving understanding of equality, 18 as well as by reference to
the mediating principle of the protected group’s access to the
political process, 19 there has been ample, if sometimes
unacknowledged, room for Congress to participate in the task of
vindicating equality rights via legislation. 20
The protection of substantive rights may be different. To the
extent originalist analysis insists that the scope and nature of a
substantive right reflect an understanding of law that is “the
business of the courts” 21 to explicate, such rights may be more
resistant to congressional attempts to contribute to their full
vindication. 22 Thus, the Court’s turn toward originalist analysis
II of the ADA, as applied to cases implicating the fundamental right of access to
the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’s enforcement power under
the Fourteenth Amendment). Another Enforcement Clause case dealing with
substantive rights, United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006), is relatively
less significant for purposes of understanding Enforcement Clause doctrine, but
is nevertheless discussed at infra note 153 and infra note 278 and accompanying
text. A final case, Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2629 (2013),
considered Congress’s cognate power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment,
which prohibits racial discrimination in voting. See infra notes 172–181 and
accompanying text (discussing Shelby County).
17. See infra Part II.A.1 (explaining those cases).
18. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687–88 (1973)
(plurality opinion) (relying in part on legislative guidance when determining
that sex discrimination is a serious national problem).
19. See id. at 685 (providing such a process-based approach to the level of
scrutiny question); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445
(1985) (performing a similar analysis).
20. See, e.g., Post, supra note 13, at 23–27 (noting this potential in the
context of the Court’s early congruence and proportionality jurisprudence).
21. See Scalia, supra note 11, at 854 (underlying the principle of judicial
review is “the perception that the Constitution . . . is in its nature the sort of
‘law’ that is the business of the courts”).
22. To be sure, one should not overstate this distinction between equality
rights, whose vindication requires recourse to cultural understandings, and
substantive rights, whose vindication turns on purely legal analysis. For
example, to the extent that courts uncover unenumerated substantive due
process rights via an analysis of the nation’s history and tradition, substantive
due process methodology could be understood to require courts to consider how
modern American culture has interacted with and related to that tradition. See,
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when interpreting substantive constitutional rights, such as Bill
of Rights provisions (as well as their incorporated analogues),
may require a new approach to congruence and proportionality
when attention turns to enforcement legislation, such as gun
rights legislation, that aims at enforcing such rights. At the very
least, such a new approach is required if the Court is to avoid the
unacceptably restricted vision of the enforcement power that
allows Congress only to craft remedies for judicially-determined
constitutional violations. 23 The Second Amendment provides an
opportunity to consider this issue. But the resulting analysis will
apply far more broadly than the gun possession right.
The Second Amendment constitutes an excellent vehicle for
this examination. Gun rights litigation is widespread, and the
Court’s refusal to clarify its jurisprudence since incorporating the
Second Amendment in 2010 24 means that lower courts have faced
a wide variety of challenges with only limited Supreme Court
guidance. The result has been a complex, multi-stage doctrine
that takes Heller’s historical/originalist analysis only as its
starting point. 25 This complexity further distances potential
Second Amendment enforcement issues from the mine run of the
e.g., Post, supra note 13, at 85 (“[D]ue process doctrine has historically engaged
in remarkably candid efforts to interpret and apply cultural values . . . .”). Such
cultural engagement would also be required to the extent a judge adopted an
approach to substantive due process methodology that self-consciously asked
about the importance of the asserted right to one’s ability to live an autonomous
life. See id. at 88 (“Instead of identifying constitutionally protected liberty
interests by reference to the contemporary significance of tradition, it began to
identify such interests by directly evaluating the intrinsic value of liberty
itself.”). Similarly, an important element of Fourth Amendment doctrine—the
question of whether Americans have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a
given context—requires courts to understand modern American culture. See
generally WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ENFORCING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE:
CONGRESSIONAL POWER, JUDICIAL DOCTRINE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 235–38
(2015) [hereinafter ARAIZA, ENFORCING]. Thus, at least some substantive rights
doctrines are heavily influenced by cultural understandings.
23. Since Boerne, only Justice Scalia has taken a position this extreme. See
Lane, 541 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing for this more limited
understanding of the enforcement power in cases other than those evaluating
racial equality enforcement legislation).
24. See infra notes 187–191 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s
most recent opinions on the issue).
25. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–77 (2008)
(explaining Heller’s originalist methodology).
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Court’s Enforcement Clause jurisprudence up to now, which has
relied heavily on the general level of scrutiny appropriate for the
particular type of discrimination Congress is seeking to deter. 26
But the Second Amendment is not the only substantive
constitutional provision that is governed by such a complex
doctrinal structure. 27 Thus, the insights one gleans from the
Second Amendment example may provide a useful template for
future enforcement power issues.
A particular facet of the Second Amendment provides a final
reason for its usefulness as a case study. Lower court Second
Amendment jurisprudence has sometimes involved claims of
penumbral rights—that is, claims that the Second Amendment
protects not just the right to possess a gun for self-defense, but
also collateral rights such as the right to transport a gun, to
conceal a gun on one’s person, and even the right to attain
proficiency in the use of a gun, say, by accessing target range
practice. 28 If Congress legislates to protect such rights under the
banner of enforcing the Second Amendment, the Court will be
faced with an additional complicating factor when it reviews the
constitutionality of such legislation.
In short, legislation enforcing the Second Amendment is
politically plausible, and will force the Court to apply its
congruence and proportionality standard in a novel doctrinal and
jurisprudential context. That challenge will be exacerbated by
both the seeming complexity of Second Amendment doctrine as it
has developed in the lower courts and the existence of penumbral
Second Amendment rights that Congress may seek to protect.
Both of these latter characteristics will increase the difficulty the
Court will face when it considers Congress’s role in vindicating
constitutional rights that the Court insists can be authoritatively
26. See supra note 8 (noting the interplay between the Enforcement Clause
and the Second Amendment after Lopez).
27. See Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights,
23 CONST. COMMENT 227, 228 (2006) (noting the variety of doctrinal tests courts
apply to different Bill of Rights provisions).
28. See, e.g., Murphy v. Guerrero, No. 1:14-CV-00026, 2016 WL 5508998, at
*20 (D. N. Mar. I Sept. 28, 2016) (considering restrictions on transport); Peruta
v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 926 (9th Cir. 2016) (considering
restrictions on concealed carry); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 697 (7th
Cir. 2011) (considering restrictions on firing ranges); Ezell v. City of Chicago,
846 F.3d 888, 893 (7th Cir. 2017) (same).
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identified only via a methodology that views law-stating as
exclusively “the business of the courts.” 29 Thus, an investigation
into Congress’s power to arm the Second Amendment is
important not just for reasons specific to that right. Rather, the
conclusions we can draw about that power may be highly relevant
to Congress’s other attempts to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment in contexts in which originalism plays a major role
in constitutional analysis.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II provides part of
the necessary background for this inquiry by telling, in an
abbreviated fashion, the story of the enforcement power, 30
beginning with the foundational case of City of Boerne v. Flores. 31
This story focuses on the Court’s application of Boerne’s
“congruence and proportionality” standard, both in the context of
substantive, due process-based rights, and equality rights. 32
Comparing how the Court has applied that test to these two types
of legislation suggests the difficulty the Court may face if and
when it confronts legislation enforcing the Second Amendment.
Part III provides the remainder of the necessary background
by telling, in similarly abridged form, the story of Heller, its
methodology for identifying the scope of the Second Amendment
right, and the lower courts’ applications of Heller. 33 While Heller
did not purport to provide—and indeed, explicitly disclaimed any
pretense to providing—a comprehensive answer to the question of
what the Second Amendment protects and what it does not, its
methodology, holding, and dicta will likely channel the Court’s
future encounters with that right, both in its directly litigated
form, 34 and in the form of challenges to congressional legislation
enforcing it. In particular, when two years after Heller, the Court
29. Scalia, supra note 11, at 854.
30. See infra Part II (describing the background necessary for this Article).
31. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (setting a
congruence and proportionality standard).
32. See infra Part II (highlighting the use of the congruence and
proportionality standard).
33. See infra Part III (describing Second Amendment jurisprudence
through an analysis of Heller).
34. See, e.g., Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1028 (2016)
(applying Heller to the question of the protected status of possession of a stun
gun).

1812

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1801 (2017)

held that the Second Amendment applies to states, 35 the Court
imported Heller’s main features and thus made them directly
relevant to both litigation challenging state and local gun
restrictions and congressional enforcement legislation. 36 Part III
considers the Second Amendment doctrine emerging from the
lower courts, and what that doctrine suggests for efforts at
congressional enforcement. 37
Part IV discusses how the extant Enforcement Clause
doctrine set forth in Part II might apply to legislation enforcing
the Second Amendment. 38 It concludes that existing enforcement
power doctrine is not fully up to the task of appropriately
enforcing the Second Amendment. 39 At least until recently, equal
protection enforcement doctrine turned heavily on the suspect
class status of the group that the enforcement legislation seeks to
protect. 40 Such suspect class analysis largely reflects courts’
institutional competence-based concerns about fuller judicial
enforcement of the equal protection guarantee. These
characteristics render the equal protection enforcement model
inapt for the different context of the Second Amendment. Because
Second Amendment doctrine does not reflect the same level of
concern about institutional competence, the Second Amendment
may be less underenforced, and thus less amenable to aggressive
congressional supplementation via enforcement legislation.
The cases considering congressional enforcement of due
process rights fare no better as models. Those cases all considered
rights better defined than the Second Amendment right. 41 Those
more precise definitions allowed the Court to compare
meaningfully the enforced constitutional right with the
35. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 788 (2010) (applying the
Second Amendment via the Fourteenth Amendment).
36. See id. at 788 (incorporating parts of the Heller analysis).
37. See infra Part III (examining the lower courts’ decisions).
38. See infra Part IV (providing analysis connecting the Enforcement
Clause with potential future legislation on the Second Amendment).
39. See infra Part IV (providing an analysis and concluding that the
current jurisprudence is insufficient).
40. See Kimel v. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 85–86 (rejecting the
Enforcement Clause argument for a statute that protected the equality rights of
a non-suspect class).
41. See infra Part IV.B (detailing “four cases involving federal legislation
defended as enforcing Fourteenth Amendment due process rights”).
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enforcement statute as part of its congruence and proportionality
review. 42 That increased precision also allowed the Court to
examine the legislative record to determine whether it reflected
congressional findings revealing constitutional violations
Congress had the authority to target. 43 As Part IV explains, the
relative lack of clarity in Second Amendment doctrine renders
these approaches inapt in the Second Amendment context. 44
Part V offers a more granular approach to the enforcement
power as applied to the Second Amendment. 45 This approach
requires courts evaluating enforcement legislation to parse the
relevant underlying rights doctrine to determine the
constitutional status of each component of that doctrine. 46 It
observes that some of those components reflect the Court’s
fundamental understanding of what the Constitution requires,
rather than decisional heuristics that suggest judicial
underenforcement of the right and, accordingly, a larger role for
42. Cf. infra Part IV.B
Applying this approach to the Second Amendment is helpful only to
the extent that Second Amendment doctrine can be stated in a
sufficiently clear and determinate way that it provides the same kind
of clear reference point for congruence and proportionality analysis
that the doctrinal test for judicial access rights provided in Lane.
Unfortunately, Second Amendment doctrine is not that
straightforward.
(citations omitted).
43. See infra Part IV.B (“The Florida Prepaid Court also had the benefit of
a relatively well-defined constitutional right, which allowed it to search the
legislative record for examples.”).
44. See infra Part IV
In contrast to the free exercise and property rights contexts in the
Second Amendment context the Court has both identified a core
version of the right, but also strongly hinted that more penumbral,
and thus necessarily hazier, versions may exist as well. The vaguer
nature of those latter rights makes it harder for a court considering
Second Amendment enforcement legislation to examine Congress’s
factual record to determine whether it reveals violations of ‘the
constitutional right.
(citations omitted).
45. See infra Part V (providing another approach to the Second
Amendment issue).
46. See infra Part V (allowing “for a congressional role in vindicating
Second Amendment rights to the extent Congress is institutionally relatively
well-suited to contribute to particular components of courts’ doctrinal analysis”).
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congressional enforcement. 47 However, it also identifies
components of the doctrine that partially rely on estimations of
the empirical world, and which thus might be particularly
amenable to congressional input. 48 Those varied components of
Second Amendment doctrine suggest a nuanced answer to the
question of how much latitude Congress should enjoy when it
seeks to enforce the Second Amendment right.
Part VI concludes the Article by considering how the lessons
learned from the Second Amendment example apply to the
enforcement power more generally. 49 It identifies several
challenges the Court will likely confront in future Enforcement
Clause cases, and explains how the approach laid out in this
Article offers the best hope for meeting them. 50
II. The Enforcement Power Since Boerne
A. Boerne
The Court established its modern enforcement power
doctrine in the 1997 case City of Boerne v. Flores. 51 Boerne
considered an Enforcement Clause challenge to the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). 52 Congress enacted RFRA in
1993 in order to overturn the Court’s decision three years earlier
in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of

47. See infra Part V (considering Congress’s comparative institutional
advantages over courts).
48. See infra Part V (explaining the varying levels of deference Congress
ought to receive).
49. See infra Part VI (broadening the applicability of the Article’s
approach).
50. See infra Part VI (explaining the need for a new approach to these
cases).
51. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (“[W]hether
Congress has exceeded its § 5 powers turns on whether there is a ‘congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end.’”).
52. See generally Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
and 5 U.S.C.). See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511 (analyzing whether RFRA exceeded
the scope of Congress’s enforcement power).
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Oregon v. Smith, 53 which gave a narrow reading to the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. 54 While ostensibly refraining
from overruling any prior Free Exercise Clause cases, Smith
announced a rule that markedly deviated from many of those
earlier
precedents
by
concluding
that
neutral
and
generally-applicable laws did not implicate the Free Exercise
Clause. 55 Thus, for example, while under pre-Smith
jurisprudence the Court might have given careful scrutiny to a
temperance law that had the effect of impairing Roman Catholic
ritual consumption of wine, under the Smith rule such a law
would not implicate the Free Exercise Clause as long as it was a
religion-neutral regulation that applied to alcohol consumption
generally. Following this approach, in Smith itself the Court
found that an Oregon law disallowing unemployment benefits for
workers fired for misconduct did not implicate the Free Exercise
Clause, even though the law was applied to two Native American
employees of a drug treatment facility who were dismissed for
engaging in sacramental use of peyote. 56
Smith was highly unpopular across the political spectrum,
and Congress enacted RFRA by huge bi-partisan margins. 57
53. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
54. See id. at 882 (“Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply, that when
otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only
the convictions but the conduct itself must be free from governmental
regulation. We have never held that, and decline to do so now.”); U.S. CONST.
amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion].”).
55. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (“Subsequent decisions have consistently
held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes).’” (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3
(1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))).
56. See id. at 890 (“Because respondents’ ingestion of peyote was prohibited
under Oregon law, and because that prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may,
consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, deny respondents unemployment
compensation when their dismissal results from use of the drug.”).
57. See Donna Barry et al., Infographic: RFRA Repercussions, CTR. AM.
PROGRESS (May 7, 2015, 2:24 PM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues
/religion/news/2015/05/07/112783/infographic-rfra-repercussions/ (last visited
Sept. 8, 2017) (“The federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or RFRA,
passed in 1993 with broad bipartisan support and an aim to protect the right of
Americans to freely believe and worship according to their consciences.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Boiled down, RFRA required that any state 58 law or regulation
that imposed a substantial burden on religious exercise be
justified by a compelling interest that the law was narrowly
tailored to accomplish. 59 This standard, of course, imposes a very
high hurdle. Even more significantly, that hurdle stands in direct
opposition to Smith’s rule that only laws targeting religious
practice implicate the Free Exercise Clause. 60 In addition to the
implicit challenge it posed to the Court’s supremacy in
constitutional interpretation, RFRA also imposed significant
federalism costs, given its imposition of a rule of conduct that
applied regardless of the state’s intent to impair
religion-motivated conduct, and, indeed, regardless even of
whether the challenged action had a disparate impact on such
conduct. 61 For example, Boerne itself involved a city’s application
of a generally-applicable historic district zoning rule to a church
that wished to demolish its structure located in that district and
build a larger, modern building. 62
In Boerne, the Court struck down RFRA’s Enforcement
Clause foundation. 63 Writing mostly 64 for a six justice majority,
58. RFRA also applies to the federal government. That aspect of the statute
does not implicate the Enforcement Clause, and thus was not at issue in Boerne,
the case that struck down the law’s applicability to states. See Boerne, 521 U.S.
at 511 (analyzing only whether RFRA exceeded the scope of Congress’s
enforcement power).
59. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3,
107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 5
U.S.C.).
60. Indeed, as Justice Kennedy noted in Boerne, RFRA’s requirement of
narrow tailoring went even beyond the Court’s pre-Smith jurisprudence that
Congress found constituted an appropriate accommodation of regulatory
prerogatives and religious freedom. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
535 (1997) (noting that RFRA “imposes in every case a least restrictive means
requirement—a requirement that was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence
RFRA purported to codify”).
61. See id. at 534 (“RFRA’s substantial-burden test, however, is not even a
discriminatory effects or disparate-impact test. It is a reality of the modern
regulatory state that numerous state laws, such as the zoning regulations at
issue here, impose a substantial burden on a large class of individuals.”).
62. For a comprehensive and detailed description of the controversy that
gave rise to Boerne, see generally JEROLD WALTMAN, CONGRESS, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CASE OF BOERNE V. FLORES (2013).
63. RFRA’s applicability to the federal government was not an issue in
Boerne.
64. See infra note 78 (providing information about the breakdown of the
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Justice Kennedy recognized that the Enforcement Clause gave
Congress the power to enact legislation that did more than
simply prescribe remedies for court-found constitutional
violations. 65 Nevertheless, he wrote that legislation enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment 66 had to be “congruen[t] and
proportion[al]” to the underlying constitutional violation the
legislation sought to deter. 67 Applying that standard to RFRA, he
found that the law “far exceed[ed]” 68 any constitutional violations
that Congress had uncovered in its hearings on RFRA.
Identifying the relevant underlying constitutional violation as
laws enacted out of “religious bigotry,” 69 he observed that those
hearings had failed to uncover evidence of such conduct on the
part of states. 70
Continuing, he characterized RFRA as an unusually harsh
and wide-ranging law. 71 Unlike the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
whose constitutionality as legislation enforcing the Fifteenth
justices’ views in the opinions).
65. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517–18 (reestablishing the Court’s stance that
Congress’s power is broad).
66. The Court has been ambiguous about whether the standard it
announced in Boerne applies as well to legislation enforcing the other
Reconstruction Amendments, or other constitutional amendments that provide
similarly-worded enforcement authority to Congress. See generally Shelby Cty.
v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (failing to state whether the standard it
announced in Boerne applies as well to legislation enforcing the other
Reconstruction Amendments, or other constitutional amendments that provide
similarly-worded enforcement authority to Congress).
67. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520 (“There must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end.”).
68. See id. at 534 (“The substantial costs RFRA exacts, both in practical
terms of imposing a heavy litigation burden on the States and in terms of
curtailing their traditional general regulatory power, far exceed any pattern or
practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as
interpreted in Smith.”).
69. See id. at 530 (reviewing RFRA’s legislative record to determine if it
included examples of “modern instances of generally applicable laws passed
because of religious bigotry”).
70. See id. at 535 (“In most cases, the state laws to which RFRA applies are
not ones which will have been motivated by religious bigotry.”).
71. See id. at 532 (The Act’s “[s]weeping coverage ensures its intrusion at
every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of
almost every description and regardless of subject matter”).
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Amendment had been established three decades before, 72 Justice
Kennedy observed that RFRA lacked any geographical limitation
or sunset provision. 73 As noted earlier, nor did it require a
disparate impact on the protected group or conduct as a trigger. 74
Again as noted above, he observed that not only was strict
scrutiny “the most demanding test known to constitutional
law,” 75 but that that standard went beyond the showing required
by the Court’s pre-Smith Free Exercise jurisprudence. 76 For these
reasons, he concluded that RFRA was not congruent and
proportional to the free exercise right it was ostensibly designed
to enforce. 77
Justice Kennedy’s analysis commanded impressive support
across the Court’s ideological spectrum. Five justices spanning
that spectrum from Justices Thomas to Ginsburg joined his
opinion in relevant part. 78 Of the remaining three justices,
Justice O’Connor explicitly endorsed the Court’s Enforcement
Clause analysis, expressing disagreement only with the Court’s
understanding of the underlying free exercise right, 79 Justice
72. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966) (holding
that the relevant “portions of the Voting Rights Act properly before us are a
valid means for carrying out the commands of the Fifteenth Amendment”). A
particular Voting Rights Act provision dealing with English literacy tests, as
applied to citizens educated in Spanish, was upheld as legislation enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966)
(“We therefore conclude that [§] 4(e), in the application challenged in this case,
is appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”).
73. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 511, 533 (1997) (noting that
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require geographic
restrictions but “[w]here . . . congressional enactment pervasively prohibits
constitutional state action . . . [geographical] limitations . . . tend to ensure
Congress’[s] means are proportionate”).
74. See id. at 535 (noting that the test for RFRA is the substantial burdens
test, not the disparate-impact test).
75. See id. at 534 (“Requiring a State to demonstrate a compelling interest
and show that it has adopted the least restrictive means of achieving that
interest is the most demanding test known to constitutional law.”).
76. See id. at 535 (“Laws valid under Smith would fall under RFRA without
regard to whether they had the object of stifling or punishing free exercise.”).
77. See id. at 536 (concluding that “RFRA contradicts vital principles
necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance”).
78. See id. at 509 (including Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, Thomas, and
Ginsburg as well as Justice Scalia, who did not join Kennedy’s historical
analysis).
79. See id. at 544–45 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
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Breyer joined most of Justice O’Connor’s opinion and indicated
his general (though not complete) agreement with her approval of
the Court’s Enforcement Clause analysis, 80 and Justice Souter
did not express a view on the Enforcement Clause issue. 81 Thus,
no justice affirmatively disagreed with the congruence and
proportionality standard, and at least seven, and possibly eight,
justices embraced it. 82
1. The Enforcement Power in Its First Post-Boerne Decade
After Boerne, most of the Court’s encounters with the
enforcement power involved legislation defended as enforcing the
equal protection rights of particular groups against
unconstitutional discrimination. 83 However, the Court’s first
post-Boerne encounter with the enforcement power considered a
law defended as legislation enforcing the right to be free of
property infringements without due process of law. In Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank, 84 the Court struck down, as exceeding the
[I]f I agreed with the Court’s standard in Smith, I would join
the [majority] opinion. As the Court’s careful and thorough
historical analysis shows, Congress lacks the power to decree
the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on
the States. . . . Accordingly, whether Congress has exceeded its
§ 5 powers turns on whether there is a “congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end.
(internal quotes and citation omitted).
80. See id. at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (expressing vague agreement with
most of O’Connor’s approval of the majority’s Enforcement Clause analysis).
81. See id. at 565 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting the inability of the
majority to soundly decide the Enforcement Clause question).
82. See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text (outlining the Justices’
opinions and arguments).
83. See generally Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327
(2012) (reviewing an enforcement statute targeting sex discrimination); Nev.
Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (same); Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356 (2001) (reviewing an enforcement statute targeting disability
discrimination); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (reviewing an
enforcement statute targeting age discrimination); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (reviewing an enforcement statute targeting sex
discrimination).
84. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
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enforcement power, an amendment to federal patent laws that
abrogated state sovereign immunity from patent infringement
lawsuits. 85 Writing for the same five-justice majority that had
generated the Court’s federalism revolution of the 1990s, 86 Chief
Justice Rehnquist concluded that the law failed Boerne’s
congruence and proportionality test because, as with RFRA,
Congress had failed to demonstrate a pattern of state violations
of the underlying right. 87 He also noted the availability of state
tort remedies for at least some of these violations; based on this
latter conclusion, he questioned whether states were in fact
depriving patent holders of their property without due process. 88
Justice Stevens, dissenting for the similarly-durable
four-justice bloc opposing the majority bloc’s federalism
jurisprudence, 89 argued that the enforcement statute satisfied
Boerne’s congruence and proportionality standard. 90 He argued
85. See id. at 647 (“The historical record and the scope of coverage therefore
make it clear that the Patent Remedy Act cannot be sustained under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
86. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking
down a federal law as exceeding Congress’s power under the Interstate
Commerce Clause); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)
(holding that Congress lacked the power to use its power to regulate interstate
commerce or commerce with Indian tribes to make non-consenting states liable
for retrospective relief); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261
(1997) (vindicating a claim of state sovereign immunity despite the prospective
nature of the relief requested); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
(holding that Congress lacked the power to commandeer state law
enforcements); Coll. Savs. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (rejecting a claim that a state had waived its sovereign
immunity by participating in federally-regulated activity). Another federalism
case from that decade, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), was
decided by this same five-justice majority, joined by Justice Souter, who would
defect from this coalition in the remaining federalism cases of the decade. See
New York, 505 U.S. at 149 (holding that Congress lacked the power to
commandeer state legislatures).
87. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640 (“In enacting the Patent Remedy
Act, however, Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement by the
States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations.”).
88. See id. at 644 (“The primary point made by these witnesses, however,
was not that state remedies were constitutionally inadequate, but rather that
they were less convenient than federal remedies, and might undermine the
uniformity of patent law.”).
89. See supra note 86 (identifying cases of new federalism jurisprudence).
90. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 649 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (claiming
that the Boerne decision “amply supports congressional authority to enact the
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that Congress did in fact have in front of it evidence of past state
constitutional violations—intentional deprivations of patent
rights. 91 Foreshadowing arguments that would be made in other
opinions urging the upholding of enforcement legislation, he also
argued that Congress was aware of the likelihood that states
would increasingly violate property rights in patents. 92 He
further argued that the protection of such rights provided a
legitimate reason for Congress to insist on a uniform application
of patent laws, via patent litigation in federal court, rather than
commending victims of alleged state government infringement to
state law tort remedies in the state’s own courts. 93
In retrospect, Florida Prepaid can be seen as the harbinger of
the justices’ attitudes toward enforcement legislation. A thin
majority would insist on stringent application of the congruence
and proportionality test, including an insistence on facts
demonstrating an actual record of state conduct that judicial
doctrine deems unconstitutional. The dissenters, by contrast,
would allow Congress more latitude in detecting the potentiality
of constitutional violations by state actors.
After Florida Prepaid, the Court’s Enforcement Clause
jurisprudence shifted focus, toward legislation defended as
enforcing equal protection rights. In a series of cases—United
States v. Morrison, 94 Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 95 Board
Patent Remedy Act”).
91. Justice Stevens hedged on the question of whether such deprivations
had to be intentional in order to violate the Constitution; nevertheless, he
argued that, assuming that intent was required, that requirement was met in
Florida Prepaid because the victim of the alleged state infringement conduct
alleged that that conduct was willful. See id. at 653–54 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“Respondent College Savings Bank has alleged that petitioner’s infringement
was willful. The question presented by this case, then, is whether the Patent
Remedy Act, which clarified Congress’[s] intent to subject state infringers to suit
in federal court, may be applied to willful infringement.”).
92. See id. at 656–57 (providing a list of cases in which states and their
instrumentalities have been involved in patent cases).
93. See id. at 659 (“Even if such remedies might be available in theory, it
would have been ‘appropriate’ for Congress to conclude that they would not
guarantee patentees due process in infringement actions against state
defendants.”).
94. See 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (affirming the appellate ruling that
Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact the civil remedy under 42
U.S.C. § 13981).
95. See 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (concluding that the “ADEA does contain a
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of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 96 and Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 97 the Court considered
whether provisions of, respectively, the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) were supportable as enforcement
legislation. 98 In each of these cases, the Court’s analysis focused
on whether the statutory provision at issue was “appropriate”
legislation enforcing the equal protection rights of the group the
given statute benefitted—women in case of VAWA and the
FMLA, elderly persons in the case of the ADEA, and disabled
persons in the case of the ADA. 99
The first of these cases, Morrison, can be dealt with quickly.
The Court in that case relied heavily on the fact that the VAWA
provision at issue regulated private parties by making a
perpetrator of gender-motivated violence liable to a federal law
cause of action brought by his victim. 100 Even though this
clear statement of Congress’[s] intent to abrogate the States’ immunity, but that
the abrogation exceeded Congress’[s] authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment”).
96. See 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (deciding “whether employees of the State
of Alabama may recover money damages by reason of the State’s failure to
comply with the provisions of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990”).
97. See 538 U.S. 721, 724 (2003) (finding that “employees of the State of
Nevada may recover money damages in the event of the State’s failure to comply
with the family-care provision of the” FMLA).
98. Except for VAWA, the Commerce Clause bona fides of these statutes
were unquestioned, a conclusion that also allowed their application to states.
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Agency, 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985)
(upholding under the Commerce Clause legislation that imposed regulatory
duties on states acting as economic actors). However, in Seminole Tribe, the
Court found that retrospective relief against state government violators, ordered
at the behest of private litigants, exceeded Congress’s authority under the
Commerce Clause. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75 (1996)
(holding that Congress lacked the power to make retrospective relief, such as
damages, available against non-consenting states). That holding left the
Enforcement Clause as the only viable constitutional foundation for such
remedies. Id.
99. See supra notes 94–97 (citing cases where the Court’s Enforcement
Clause jurisprudence shifted focus, toward legislation defended as enforcing
equal protection rights).
100. See Morrison, 529 U.S at 604 (describing the procedural posture of
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University).
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provision was defended on the ground that state and local law
enforcement often under-investigated and under-enforced
gender-motivated violence, Morrison rejected its Enforcement
Clause foundation 101 because the law regulated private parties
rather than state actors. 102
Kimel is the first of these cases that involved a statute
explicitly regulating states and thus actually requiring in-depth
consideration of the congruence and proportionality standard. 103
While Kimel’s application of that standard is relatively brief, it
nevertheless created the template for future Enforcement Clause
cases involving equality-enforcing legislation. In Kimel, Justice
O’Connor, writing for the same five-justice majority as that in
Morrison and Florida Prepaid, began by observing that age was
not a suspect classification under the Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence. 104 For the majority, that conclusion in turn
justified skeptical review of the ADEA’s congruence and
proportionality to what it had concluded was the trivial
constitutional problem posed by age discrimination. 105 That
review led Justice O’Connor to conclude that the ADEA
101. See id. at 627 (concluding that Congress’s “power under § 5 does not
extend to the enactment of § 13981”). The same justices that rejected the
provision’s Enforcement Clause foundation also held the provision to exceed
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. See id. (“Congress’[s] effort in
§ 13981 to provide a federal civil remedy can be sustained neither under the
Commerce Clause nor under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
102. The Court reasoned that this private-party remedy against other
private parties rendered the provision per se inappropriate enforcement
legislation, based on early Enforcement Clause precedent, and also meant that
the law failed Boerne’s congruence and proportionality test. See id. at 621–25
(stating precedent); id. at 625–27 (performing congruence and proportionality
analysis). The Court also quickly noted at the end of its analysis that the VAWA
provision also failed congruence and proportionality because it applied
throughout the nation, even though Congress had documented the problem of
official neglect of gender-motivated crimes in fewer than half the states. See id.
at 626 (“Congress’[s] findings indicate that the problem of discrimination
against the victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all States, or
even most States.”).
103. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81–82 (2000)
(highlighting the congruence and proportionality standard). But see supra note
102 (noting Morrison’s congruence and proportionality analysis).
104. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 (“Age . . . does not define a discrete and
insular minority because all persons, if they live out their normal life spans, will
experience it.”).
105. See id. at 82–83 (performing such skeptical review).
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prevented very little conduct that was likely to be
unconstitutional. 106
To be sure, Justice O’Connor acknowledged that the
Enforcement Clause authorized Congress to enact “reasonably
prophylactic legislation”—that is, legislation that prohibited
conduct that did not in itself violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. 107 That concession required her to examine
Congress’s legislative record, to determine whether Congress had
identified a pattern of state constitutional violations in this area
that justified a prophylactic deterrent. 108 She concluded that that
record revealed only “isolated sentences clipped from floor
debates and legislative reports,” an evaluation that led her to
conclude that the ADEA’s application to states was “an
unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem.” 109
The next case, Garrett, posed a more difficult question for the
Court. Garrett involved an enforcement power challenge to the
employment provisions of the ADA. 110 Two factors made Garrett a
harder case than Kimel. First, unlike the ADEA, the ADA
featured a voluminous legislative record, which identified a long
list of instances of state discrimination against disabled
employees. 111 Second, the Court’s disability discrimination
jurisprudence was more nuanced than its age discrimination
counterpart. 112 Most importantly, in 1985, in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 113 the Court had concluded that a city’s
106. See id. at 86 (stating the ADEA would “prohibit[] substantially more
state employment decisions and practices than would likely be held
unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, rational basis
standard”).
107. See id. at 88 (“[W]e have never held that § 5 precludes Congress from
enacting reasonably prophylactic legislation.”).
108. See id. at 89 (“Congress never identified any pattern of age
discrimination by the States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose
to the level of constitutional violation.”).
109. Id. at 89.
110. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001)
(“We decide here whether employees of the State of Alabama may recover money
damages by reason of the State’s failure to comply with the provisions of Title I
of the [ADA] . . . .”).
111. See id. at 368 (noting the legislative record).
112. See infra notes 113–117 (discussing the analytical differences between
age discrimination and disability discrimination cases).
113. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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discrimination against intellectually disabled persons violated
the Equal Protection Clause because it was based on “irrational
prejudice.” 114 That conclusion confounded the normal equal
protection template, in which discrimination against non-suspect
classes—including the disabled—normally triggered the most
deferential rational basis review that almost necessarily resulted
in a rejection of the equal protection claim. 115 Indeed, in contrast
to Cleburne’s analysis of disability discrimination, the Court’s age
discrimination jurisprudence in Garrett followed exactly the
normal equal protection template. 116 Together, these two factors
painted a picture in which the ADA’s employment provisions
targeted discrimination that at least potentially raised a more
serious constitutional problem, and which Congress had
identified as occurring frequently. 117
Despite these differences, in Garrett the Court adhered
closely to the template it had created a year before in Kimel.
Writing for the same five-justice majority as that in Florida
Prepaid, Morrison, and Kimel, Chief Justice Rehnquist began by
dismissing the idea that Cleburne suggested that disability
114. See id. at 450 (requiring the permit in this case “to rest on an irrational
prejudice against the mentally retarded, including those who would occupy the
Featherston facility and who would live under the closely supervised and highly
regulated conditions expressly provided for by state and federal law”).
115. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (“The State need
therefore assert only a rational basis for its age classification.”); Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108–09 (1979) (“Because Congress desired to maintain the
competence of the Foreign Service, the mandatory retirement age of 60
rationally furthers its legitimate objective . . . .”); Mass. Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (stating that rational basis is “a relatively
relaxed standard reflecting the Court’s awareness that the drawing of lines that
create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one”).
116. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367 (“A classification cannot run afoul of the
Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity
of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” (quoting Heller v.
Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (applying traditionally deferential rational basis
scrutiny to a disability classification))); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470 (applying the
same equal protection analysis); Vance, 440 U.S. at 108–09 (same); Murgia, 427
U.S. at 314 (same).
117. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367 (“Congress made a general finding in the
ADA that ‘historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals
with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive
social problem.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2002))).
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discrimination merited special judicial scrutiny. 118 Instead, he
described Cleburne as applying “minimum ‘rational basis’
review” 119 to strike down a government action that simply “made
no sense.” 120 He then proceeded to minimize the force of
Congress’s factual record documenting state government
employment discrimination against the disabled. 121 Among other
things, he dismissed as irrelevant examples from local
governments 122 and insisted that any remaining examples would
only be relevant if they revealed discrimination that would have
been adjudged unconstitutional had they been litigated in a
court. 123 More broadly, he rejected the relevance of Congress’s
finding that, as a general matter, society continued to isolate and
discriminate against disabled persons. 124 With Congress’s record
cut down to size, and the significance of the underlying
constitutional violation minimized, the way was clear for the
Chief Justice to conclude, as Justice O’Connor had in Kimel, that
the ADA was a disproportionate response to what the Court
declared to be an insignificant constitutional problem. 125
In the next case, Hibbs, the Court continued to ground its
Enforcement Clause analysis on the suspect class status of the
group the challenged enforcement legislation sought to protect. 126
Hibbs considered the family-care leave provision of the FMLA—a
provision that gave workers uncompensated time off from work to
118. See id. at 367–68 (2001) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment does
not require states to make accommodations for the disabled if the state has a
rational basis for its decision).
119. Id. at 366
120. Id. at 366 n.4.
121. See id. at 369–72 (revealing the Court’s general dismissal of Congress’s
record).
122. See id. at 369 (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not extend its
immunity to units of local government.”).
123. See id. at 370 (observing that constitutional violations will rarely arise
from adverse and disparate treatment). Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
emphasized this point in particular. See id. at 374–76 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(stating that no judicial documentation of constitutional violations exists).
124. See id. at 369–70 (majority opinion) (noting that adverse and disparate
treatment generally do not amount to a constitutional violation).
125. See id. at 374 (“[T]o uphold the Act’s application to the States would
allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this
Court in Cleburne.”).
126. See generally Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
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care for sick relatives. 127 In a departure from the Court’s
application of the congruence and proportionality analysis up to
that point, the Court upheld this provision of the FMLA as valid
enforcement legislation protecting women’s equal protection
rights. 128 Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote for himself and
Justice O’Connor and the four justices who had dissented in the
earlier post-Boerne cases, began his analysis by recognizing that
sex classifications merited heightened judicial scrutiny. 129 That
fact gave him the latitude to credit the type of legislative record
evidence that he had found inadequate two years earlier in
Garrett. 130
After according generous review to the evidence supporting
the FMLA’s enforcement power bona fides, Chief Justice
Rehnquist then distinguished Kimel and Garrett. He did so
expressly on the ground of the different levels of constitutional
protection accorded sex discrimination as compared with either
disability or age discrimination. 131 He wrote the following
immediately after concluding that “[i]n sum, the States’ record of
unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based
discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is weighty
enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic § 5 legislation:” 132
We reached the opposite conclusion in Garrett and Kimel. In
those cases, the § 5 legislation under review responded to a
purported tendency of state officials to make age- or
127. See id. at 724 (“[It] entitles eligible employees to take up to 12 work
weeks of unpaid leave annually for any of several reasons, including the onset of
a ‘serious health condition’ in an employee’s spouse, child, or parent.” (citation
omitted)).
128. As the Court explained, the family-care leave provision aimed at
ensuring that women were not penalized for taking time off work to care for sick
relatives, by granting all employees a right to take such leave. See id. at 736–37
(discussing these aims of the provision).
129. See id. at 730 (“The long and extensive history of sex discrimination
prompted us to hold that measures that differentiate on the basis of gender
warrant heightened scrutiny . . . .”).
130. See id. (relying on evidence of private-sector discrimination). But see id.
at 730 n.3 (noting evidence stating, in general terms, that state government
conduct in this area “differs little” from that of private sector actors).
131. See id. at 735–36 (stating that discrimination based on age or disability
is not evaluated under the heightened standard for sexual discrimination, but
rather utilizes a rational basis standard).
132. Id. at 735.
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disability-based distinctions. Under our equal protection case
law, discrimination on the basis of such characteristics is not
judged under a heightened review standard, and passes
muster if there is a rational basis for doing so at a class-based
level . . . . Thus, in order to impugn the constitutionality of
state discrimination against the disabled or the elderly,
Congress must identify, not just the existence of age- or
disability-based state decisions, but a widespread pattern of
irrational reliance on such criteria. We found no such showing
with respect to the ADEA and Title I of the [ADA].
Here, however, Congress directed its attention to state gender
discrimination, which triggers a heightened level of scrutiny.
Because the standard for demonstrating the constitutionality
of a gender-based classification is more difficult to meet than
our
rational-basis
test—it
must
“serve
important
governmental objectives” and be “substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives”—it was easier for Congress to
show a pattern of state constitutional violations. 133

Thus, in all three of these cases, the Court’s identification of the
suspect class status of the benefitted group was foundational to
its enforcement power analysis. 134 The significance of this fact
133. Id. at 735–36 (citations, internal quotations, and brackets omitted).
134. See, e.g., Y. Frank Ren, Fixing Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement
Power: An Argument for a Rebuttable Presumption in Favor of Congressional
Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1459, 1464–68 (2013)
(noting the importance to the Court’s enforcement power analysis of the scrutiny
level accorded to direct constitutional claims involving the right protected by the
enforcement legislation); see also id. at 1469 (“In many [enforcement power
cases invalidating the enforcement legislation] the Court emphasized how
important the levels of scrutiny were in its congruence and proportionality
analysis.”); id. at 1471 (“Boerne and its progeny clarified that Congress’s
authority to pass legislation under its enforcement power is not limitless, but
rather restricted based on the importance of the right that Congress intended to
protect.”); Gillian Egan, Unreasonable Requirements for Reasonable
Enforcement: “Congruence and Proportionality” After Coleman v. Court of
Appeals of Maryland, 43 CUMB. L. REV. 29, 38 (2013) (“In reviewing whether
legislation meets [the requirements of congruence and proportionality], the
court applies the level of scrutiny such a classification usually receives in Equal
Protection cases, whether it be rational, intermediate, strict, or some other
standard.”); Massey, supra note 8, at 2
The distilled product of [the post-Boerne Enforcement Clause] cases is
the notion that judicial deference to Congress concerning the proper
scope of such preventive measures varies in rough proportion to the
level of judicial scrutiny the Court invokes to test the validity of state
actions that allegedly violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
See also Even Tsen Lee, The Trouble with City of Boerne, and Why It Matters for
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goes beyond the (perhaps unsurprising) insight that congruence
and proportionality review relies heavily on the constitutional
status of the problem the enforcement legislation targets. 135 In
the Kimel/Garrett/Hibbs trilogy, what mattered to the Court was
not so much that constitutional status of simpliciter, but rather,
that status as translated into a judicially-workable doctrine via
the tiered scrutiny framework. 136 That framework, which rests
ultimately on the political process-based reasoning derived from
the famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 137 assigns to different classifications different levels of
judicial scrutiny depending on the Court’s perception of the
burdened group’s ability to protect itself in the majoritarian
political process. 138 Most notably, the lowest-tier standard of
review, rational basis, rests on a presumption that groups
assigned that standard can protect themselves in the political
process and thus do not need extraordinary judicial protection. 139
Thus, the tiers of scrutiny are decisional heuristics rather than
expressions of core constitutional principle. As explained later, 140

the Fifteenth Amendment as Well, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 483, 502 (2012)
(approving of this approach).
135. See Ren, supra note 134, at 1469 (noting how carefully Enforcement
Clause doctrine in these cases focused the Court’s congruence and
proportionality analysis on the level of scrutiny triggered by the type of
discrimination targeted by the challenged enforcement legislation).
136. See id. (“In . . . these cases, the Court emphasized how important the
levels of scrutiny were in its congruence and proportionality analysis.”).
137. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
138. See id. at 152 n.4 (discussing “prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities” and its impact on the political process, and the resultant need for
more careful judicial review when such prejudice was found to exist).
139. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 96–97 (1979)
Appellees have not suggested that the [challenged] statutory
distinction . . . burdens a suspect group or a fundamental interest;
and in cases where these considerations are absent, courts are quite
reluctant to overturn governmental action on the ground that it
denies equal protection of the laws. The Constitution presumes that,
absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions
will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial
intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we
may think a political branch has acted.
140. See infra notes 219–232 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s
continued silence on the standard of review).
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this fact further complicates congruence and proportionality
review.
The Court’s next Enforcement Clause case, Tennessee v.
Lane, 141 marked the effective end of the Court’s first decade of
applying Boerne. 142 Lane differed from the Kimel/Garrett/Hibbs
trilogy because it chose to test, and ultimately uphold, the
application of the enforcement statute in question on due process
rather than equal protection grounds. 143 Nevertheless, Lane
reinforced the basic idea developed in that trilogy—that the fate
of an enforcement statute would turn on whether it enforced a
right judicial doctrine treated as constitutionally significant.
Lane dealt with the public services provisions of the ADA—that
is, those provisions that guaranteed access to “the services,
programs or activities of a public entity.” 144 It involved a lawsuit
by two physically disabled persons—a court reporter and a
defendant in a criminal case—who were unable to access the
upper floors of a state courthouse. 145 When they sued the state, it
pleaded sovereign immunity, and alleged that the public services
provision exceeded Congress’s power under the Enforcement
Clause. 146
Writing for a five-justice majority (the justices in the Hibbs
majority minus Chief Justice Rehnquist), 147 Justice Stevens
began by acknowledging that the Court could analyze the statute
as either enforcing the equal protection rights of disabled persons
141. See 541 U.S. 509, 513 (2004) (deciding “whether Title II exceeds
Congress’ power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
142. To be sure, the Court did decide one final case in the decade after
Boerne. See generally United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006) (ruling in
2006, nine years after Boerne was decided in 1997). Georgia is discussed at infra
note 153 (explaining that case as involving legislation enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment as applied to conduct that, if proven, was conceded to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment) and at infra note 281.
143. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 515 (upholding the application of the ADA
challenged in that case as legislation enforcing the Due Process Clause).
144. Id. at 509 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012)).
145. See id. at 513–14 (stating that the defendant crawled up two flights of
steps and the court reporter was deprived of work opportunities).
146. See id. at 514 (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment bars private suits seeking
money damages for state violations of Title I of the ADA.”).
147. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the principal dissent for himself and
Justices Kennedy and Thomas. Justice Scalia dissented separately.
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or the due process right to access the judicial process. 148
Concluding that a ruling focused on the latter right would be
narrower, Justice Stevens chose to consider whether the public
services provision was a congruent and proportional enforcement
of the constitutional right to courthouse access. 149 Regardless of
the reason, 150 his decision to narrow the focus of his analysis
allowed him to conclude that the public services provision was
indeed “congruent and proportional to its object of enforcing the
right of access to the courts.” 151 He argued that the ADA’s
standard—that public services provide “reasonable modifications”
to their programs to allow disabled access—was “perfectly
consistent” with the Court’s constitutional standard for access to
the judicial process: That “within the limits of practicability, a
State must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to
be heard in its courts.” 152 Thus, in Lane, the scope of the
underlying right played a crucial role in the congruence and
proportionality analysis, just as it had in the three preceding
enforcement power cases. 153
148. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 514–15 (recognizing that there were two ways to
analyze the statute).
149. See id. at 522–23 (noting that these provisions of the ADA guaranteed
against both irrationality disability discrimination and “a variety of other basic
constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more searching
judicial review”).
150. Presumably, this choice was also influenced by his desire to avoid the
implications of Garrett, which had frowned upon enforcement legislation aimed
generally at the equal protection rights of disabled persons.
151. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004).
152. Id. at 532 (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. The final case of Boerne’s first decade was Georgia. In Georgia, a
unanimous Court held that a federal law was valid Enforcement Clause
legislation to the extent it simply creates a private cause of action for conduct
that violates the Fourteenth Amendment itself. United States v. Georgia, 546
U.S. 151, 159 (2006). Georgia dealt with the ADA’s public services provision—
the same provision at issue in Lane—as applied to a state prison’s alleged denial
of a number of services to a disabled inmate. Id. at 154–55. Most importantly,
the inmate-plaintiff alleged, and the state-defendant conceded, that the state’s
conduct, if proven, would violate both the ADA and the Eighth Amendment (and
hence the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth). Id. at 157.
Thus, Georgia posed the straightforward question of whether the ADA’s
provision of money damages for violations of the public services provision
constituted appropriate enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause when applied to conduct that was alleged actually to violate the
Due Process Clause. So understood, it should come as no surprise that the Court
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B. The Enforcement Power Today

Since Lane, the Supreme Court has decided two significant
cases considering the breadth of the enforcement power. 154 Both
of them have called into the question the Court’s post-Boerne
approach.
The first of these cases returned to the question of the
constitutionality of prophylactic enforcement legislation, 155 but
adopted an analysis that raised questions about the durability of
the template created by the prophylactic legislation cases
discussed above. In Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, 156
the Court considered the personal-care leave provision of the
FMLA—the same statute whose family-care leave provision was
upheld in Hibbs. 157 Both the personal and family-care leave
provisions were defended as measures enforcing the equal
protection right to sex equality. 158 As noted earlier, much of the
defense for the family-care leave provision centered on the
argument that stereotypical views about women’s primary
unanimously upheld this application of the ADA’s public services provision. As
Justice Scalia explained in writing the opinion for the Court:
While the Members of th[e] Court have disagreed regarding the scope
of Congress’s “prophylactic” enforcement powers under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, no one doubts that § 5 grants Congress the
power to “enforce . . . the provisions” of the Amendment by creating
private remedies against the States for actual violations of those
provisions.
Id. at 158 (citations omitted). But just as Georgia states an unremarkable
proposition of Enforcement Clause doctrine, it adds little to the far more
nuanced issues discussed in other post-Boerne cases.
154. To repeat a point made earlier, a third case, Georgia, posed a more
straightforward enforcement power question that did not cause controversy
among the justices. See supra note 153 (discussing Georgia); infra note 155 and
accompanying text (same).
155. Cf. Georgia, 546 U.S. at 158 (noting the disagreement among the
justices about the constitutionality of enforcement legislation that is
prophylactic in nature).
156. 566 U.S. 30 (2012) (plurality opinion).
157. See id. at 33 (“The statute in question is the Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993 . . . .”); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724 (2003)
(finding that “employees of the State of Nevada may recover money damages in
the event of the State’s failure to comply with the family-care provision” of the
FMLA).
158. See Coleman, 566 US. at 42 (noting the defense in detail).
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responsibility for domestic affairs (including caretaking) led
employers to disfavor women as employees. 159
The personal-care leave provision was defended on similar,
but distinct grounds. In addition to arguing that that provision
ensured sex equality by prohibiting pregnancy discrimination (an
argument the Court rejected for other reasons 160), defenders of
the personal-care leave provision also insisted that it served as a
“necessary adjunct to the family-care leave provision sustained in
Hibbs.” 161 The argument was that the family-care leave provision,
while intended to promote sex equality, would have had the
perverse effect of encouraging sex discrimination if enacted as a
standalone provision. 162 The theory was that providing family
care leave, when coupled with lingering perceptions that family
care was a woman’s job, made women even less desirable as
On
this
theory,
women
would
still
employees. 163
disproportionately ask for such leave (or would be perceived as
doing so)—but now, with the family-care leave provision in place,
they would have a right to it. According to its defenders, the
personal-care leave provision stepped in to equalize either the
reality or least the perception of the burdens male and female
workers would place on employers via FMLA leave. 164 With both
men and women asking for personal care leave, defenders argued,
FMLA leave in general would come to be seen less as a woman’s
right and more as an employee’s right, which in turn would tend
to equalize men’s and women’s desirability as employees. 165
159. See supra note 128 (discussing the aim of the family-care leave
provision).
160. See Coleman, 566 U.S. at 39 (rejecting the argument that the provision
addressed any pregnancy-related discrimination in which states might be
engaging).
161. Id. at 37.
162. See id. at 39 (noting the plaintiff’s argument that “[w]hen the self-care
provision is coupled with the family-care provisions, the self-care provision could
reduce the difference in the expected number of weeks of FMLA leave that
different employees take”).
163. See id. at 45, 60–61 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining this
argument).
164. See id. at 39 (stating the plaintiff’s argument that men would be
encouraged to take more time off while women continue to take the same
amount).
165. See id. (noting the plaintiff’s argument that increased leave for both
sexes would reduce the number of people viewing it as strictly a women’s right).
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A four-justice plurality, speaking through Justice Kennedy,
rejected this analysis. 166 He characterized the argument
recounted above as “overly complicated” and “unconvincing,” 167
concluded that it lacked support in the legislative record, and
argued that it created an internal contradiction to the extent
advocates also argued that the self-care leave provision helped
women because women took more personal care leave time than
men. 168
But what Justice Kennedy said is less important than what
he did not say. At no point did Justice Kennedy cite Hibbs’s
language about sex equality meriting heightened judicial
protection, and Hibbs’s follow-on conclusion that therefore “it was
easier” 169 for Congress to justify legislation enforcing that right.
Instead, what he expressed was impatience and skepticism about
whether the personal-care leave provision did in fact effectively
enforce that right—sentiments that at the very least stand in
some tension with the “easier” congressional task described in
Hibbs. 170
It is difficult to know whether Coleman portends a new era of
Enforcement Clause jurisprudence, or is simply a one-off case
166. Justice Scalia provided the fifth vote, but he refused to join the
plurality’s analysis as he had previously renounced his agreement with the
congruence and proportionality standard in favor of an even more stringent
standard for judging enforcement legislation. Id. at 44–45 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
167. See id. at 40 (plurality opinion) (“Petitioner’s overly complicated
argument about how the self-care provision works in tandem with the
family-care provisions is unconvincing and in the end does not comply with the
clear requirements of City of Boerne.”).
168. See id. at 40 (“But if the first defense is correct, the second defense is
wrong. In other words, if employers assume women take self-care leave more
often than men (the first defense), a self-care provision will not provide an
incentive to hire women.”).
169. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003)
(“Because the standard for demonstrating the constitutionality of a genderbased classification is more difficult to meet than our rational-basis test . . . it
was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations.”).
170. Cf. Robert Post & Reva Segal, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Protection After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 461
(2000) (“If the exercise of congressional Section 5 power [had to] be congruent
and proportional to behavior that a court would hold unconstitutional under
rational basis review, virtually all antidiscrimination legislation, except that
protecting racial minorities and women, [would] be rendered beyond Congress’s
Section 5 power[s].”).
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dealing with an enforcement statute that was perhaps unusually
poorly justified. 171 A subsequent case, however, does suggest that
Coleman may in fact presage evolution in Enforcement Clause
doctrine. In Shelby County v. Holder, 172 the Court struck down
the coverage formula governing the preclearance provisions of the
Voting Rights Act (VRA). 173 That result effectively invalidated the
preclearance provisions themselves, a crucial component of the
VRA.
Shelby County’s significance for the enforcement power is
unclear, given the Court’s ambiguity about the doctrinal standard
it was applying. 174 But despite that ambiguity, its analysis at
least raises the possibility that Coleman may not be a one-off in
its focus on the effectiveness of the statute in enforcing the
constitutional right at issue. Just as in Coleman, in Shelby
171. This weakness may be traced to the fact that, at base, Congress was
likely targeting pregnancy discrimination with the personal care leave
provision. The Court rejected this justification because of insufficient findings of
such discrimination by the states—but also perhaps, as Justice Ginsburg noted
in her dissent, because the Court refused to accept the proposition that
pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination. See Coleman v. Court of
Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 54–55 (2012) (plurality opinion) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (discussing precedent that distinguished discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy from discrimination on the basis of sex, but noting that “this case
is a fit occasion to revisit that conclusion”).
172. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
173. The Court suggested that it was reviewing those provisions as a
measure designed to enforce both the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth
Amendments, and referred to an earlier opinion construing the VRA as
“guiding” the Court’s review. See id. at 2622 n.1 (noting that the decision in
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder “guides our
review under both Amendments in this case”). However, that earlier opinion
said essentially nothing about the standard of review—a silence that was
repeated in Shelby County itself. See generally Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at
2612. On its own merits, this raises the important question of whether Boerne’s
congruence and proportionality standard applies to legislation enforcing the
Fifteenth Amendment (and, by implication, legislation enforcing the Thirteenth,
and perhaps legislation adopted pursuant to similarly-worded enforcement
clauses in other constitutional amendments). Cf. Derek Muller, Judicial Review
of Congressional Power Before and After Shelby County v. Holder, 8
CHARLESTON L. REV. 287, 303–06 (2013) (discussing the possible reasons for the
Court’s refusal to settle this question in Shelby County). For our more limited
purposes, Shelby County introduces new considerations into the analysis of
legislation enforcing Fourteenth Amendment rights, as noted in the text
following this note. See generally Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2612.
174. See supra note 173 (noting this ambiguity).
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County the Court faulted the fit between the enforcement statute
and the constitutional right it sought to vindicate. 175 According to
the Court, the problem with the VRA was that the preclearance
provisions’ coverage formula, unchanged in over fifty years, no
longer reflected contemporary realities about minority political
participation in the covered jurisdictions. 176 Chief Justice
Roberts, writing for the five-justice majority, cited evidence of
minority voter registration and turnout in those jurisdictions to
conclude that those areas no longer exhibited unusually high
levels of minority voter exclusion as compared with non-covered
jurisdictions. 177
One can disagree with that conclusion—indeed, the
dissenters did so, vociferously, 178 as have many scholars. 179 For
our purposes, however, the important point is that the Court
tested enforcement legislation and found it wanting, but not
because,
as
in
Kimel
or
Garrett,
it
attacked
a
constitutionally-insignificant problem. Such a rationale would
have been utterly implausible, given the centrality of racial
equality to the Fourteenth Amendment and the very
subject-matter of the Fifteenth Amendment—racial equality in

175. See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2625–30 (concluding that the VRA’s
preclearance formula no longer reflected current conditions).
176. See id. at 2618 (“[T]he conditions that originally justified these
measures no longer characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions.”).
177. See id. at 2625 (“[V]oter turnout and registration rates now approach
parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And
minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.” (quoting Nw. Austin
Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009))).
178. See id. at 2633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that “the Court today
terminates the remedy that proved to be best suited to block” the discrimination
targeted by the VRA).
179. See, e.g., Kareem Crayton & Jane Junn, Five Justices, Section 4, and
Three Ways Forward in Voting Rights, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 113,
113 (2013) (“[T]he decision is one of several demonstrating the Court’s
skepticism about federal safeguards for racial minorities’ role in political
discourse.”); Richard Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 726–38 (2014) (criticizing the Court’s analysis in
Shelby County as “false minimalism”); Joel Keller, Shelby County and the End
of History, 44 U. MEM. L. REV. 357, 358 (2013) (discussing the Court’s failure to
recognize the power of the past and the burden of memory likewise resulted in
an incomplete analysis of the continued necessity, and thus the continued
constitutionality, of the federal-oversight provision).
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voting rights. 180 Rather, just as in Coleman, the Shelby County
Court omitted any statement about the importance of the right
and how that importance influenced its enforcement power
analysis. Instead, and again distantly, but distinctly echoing
Coleman, the Court focused on whether the enforcement statute
constituted a well-designed weapon against the constitutional
violations the statute targeted. 181
Thus, Coleman and Shelby County may herald a new
approach to enforcement power analysis, one that deemphasizes
or even ignores the constitutional status of the right the
enforcement statute seeks to protect and focuses instead on how
well the statute accomplishes its stated task. If so, one must
wonder whether this new approach supersedes or provides an
alternative to the one applied in Kimel, Garrett, Hibbs, and Lane,
or instead, whether such an “effectiveness” inquiry constitutes a
new threshold test that applies before the approach in the Kimel
line is triggered. In any event, it is clear that analysis under the
180. Indeed, for this reason, one scholar, who otherwise applauds the
Court’s use of its own constitutional rights doctrine to establish the degree of
latitude Congress enjoys to enforce that particular right (the approach taken in
Kimel, Garrett, and Hibbs), expressed concern about the then-impending
possibility that the Court could invalidate the VRA’s preclearance provisions.
See Lee, supra note 134, at 502 (discussing the preclearance provisions); id.
(“Race discrimination, no less under the Fifteenth Amendment than the
Fourteenth, is the most suspect kind of state action. When Congress acts
pursuant to its Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers to
combat such action, those enactments must be given the widest berth
possible.”).
181. Compare Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2628 (2013)
In 1965, the States could be divided into two groups: those with a
recent history of voting tests and low voter registration and turnout,
and those without those characteristics. Congress based its coverage
formula on that distinction. Today the Nation is no longer divided
along those lines, yet the Voting Rights Act continues to treat it as if
it were.
With Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 40 (2012) (describing the
plaintiff’s justification of the FMLA’s family care leave provision as “overly
complicated” and “unpersuasive”). To be sure, Shelby County also relied on other
rationales to cast doubt on the coverage formula. Most notably, it argued that a
principle of “equal sovereignty” presumptively required that burdens placed on
all states be equal—a requirement that was not met by the coverage formula’s
selection of particular states and counties to bear the burdens of the
preclearance provisions. See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2623–24 (“[T]he
fundamental principles of equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent in
assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States.”).
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congruence and proportionality standard—which had been
relatively stable, if controversial—may be becoming unsettled. It
is also possible that these cases herald an Enforcement Clause
doctrine unmoored from underlying constitutional rights
doctrine, in which the Court engages in standardless, ad hoc
scrutiny of an enforcement statute’s effectiveness. 182 These
possibilities behoove us to consider how congruence and
proportionality review might operate in new enforcement clause
contexts, such as legislation enforcing the Second Amendment.
III. Heller, Its Methodology, and Lower Court Applications
Since the Court’s 2008 Heller decision, finding the Second
Amendment to guarantee a personal right of gun possession, and
especially its 2010 McDonald decision, which incorporated that
right to apply against the states, lower courts have puzzled over a
variety of issues related to the gun possession right. 183 Most
fundamentally, they have considered the doctrinal significance of
the distinction between what Heller described as the “core” 184
right of law-abiding citizens to use commonly-preferred weapons
to defend themselves in their home and presumptively less “core”
possession rights. Relatedly, they have considered the proper
standard of review for evaluating restrictions on different
locations for gun possession (e.g., in the home or in public),
restrictions on possessing certain types of weapons, and
restrictions on possession by different types of persons (e.g.,
felons, recipients of domestic violence restraining orders, and
mentally ill persons). 185 Finally, they have considered the proper
182. See generally William D. Araiza, The Enforcement Power in Crisis, 18
U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1 (2015) [hereinafter Araiza, Crisis] (discussing
problems with the Court’s current approach to congruence and proportionality
review).
183. See supra notes 152–159 (discussing the issues that the Supreme Court
has left unresolved regarding gun possession rights).
184. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) (stating
that requiring firearms to be kept inoperable in the home prevents people from
being able to protect their home, the “core” reason to possess a firearm).
185. See id. at 626–27 (“[O]ur opinion should [not] be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such
as schools and government buildings . . . .”).
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analytical framework for analyzing restrictions on collateral
rights related to gun possession and use (e.g., restrictions on
target practice facilities and on the sale of firearms). 186
The Supreme Court has provided almost no guidance on
these difficult questions. Because both Heller and McDonald
dealt with infringements on what Heller described as the core
Second Amendment right, 187 they did not have cause to address
other gun regulations that cannot be so described. 188 Aside from a
brief per curiam opinion described by a concurring justice as
“grudging,” which held that the Second Amendment protects the
possession of stun guns, since McDonald, the Court has
steadfastly refused to comment on the scope of the Second
Amendment right. 189 This silence is not for lack of opportunity to
speak, because McDonald made the Second Amendment “fully
applicable” to the states, 190 the Court has denied certiorari in
several cases where the lower court has upheld a gun
restriction—sometimes in the face of a vigorous dissent from that
denial. 191
186. Other scholars have described these issues slightly differently. See, e.g.,
Volokh, supra note 3, 1443 (describing “scope justifications,” “burden
justifications,” “danger reduction justifications,” and “government as proprietor
justifications” for regulating gun possession).
187. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 (describing the law in terms that make it
clear that it infringes the right the majority described as the core of the Second
Amendment); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 749 (2010) (describing
the laws challenged in that case as “similar” to the District of Columbia law so
described in Heller).
188. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“[T]here will be time enough to expound
upon the historical justifications for the [gun regulations the Court suggested
were constitutional] if and when those [regulations] come before us.”).
189. See Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1033 (2016) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (stating that “[t]his Court’s grudging per curiam now sends the case
back to” the same state court that rejected the Second Amendment claim
originally).
190. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750 (“Applying the standard that is well
established in our case law, we hold that the Second Amendment right is fully
applicable to the States.”).
191. See Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1996–2000 (2017) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (stating disapproval of the Court denying certiorari); Friedman v.
City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 447–50 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(same); Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799, 2799 (2015) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (same); Sessions v. Binderup, 137 S. Ct. 2323, 2323 (2017)
(Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting) (dissenting without opinion from denial
of certiorari).
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This failure to clarify the Second Amendment right is also
not due to the lack of need for such clarification. On the contrary,
lower courts interpreting the Second Amendment have disagreed
with each other 192 and have often been quite tentative in the
breadth of their holdings. 193 This lack of a confident consensus
among the lower courts reflects fundamental difficulties in
creating a coherent Second Amendment jurisprudence. Those
difficulties, while themselves noteworthy, are not the main focus
of this Article. Rather, this Article focuses on how those
difficulties will further complicate the already-challenging task of
applying congruence and proportionality review to legislation
enforcing the Second Amendment. In turn, that complexity will
illustrate the broader problem courts will have in applying the
congruence and proportionality standard to legislation enforcing
other substantive rights protected by the Due Process Clause. 194
This Part of the Article begins the process of proving these
propositions by examining the complexities of Second
Amendment jurisprudence and considering how they impact the
enforcement power as it relates to the Second Amendment. 195
Part IV considers how the Court’s extant approaches to
congruence and proportionality review might respond to the
challenges posted by Second Amendment enforcement
legislation. 196 Part V will offer a more granular approach to the
192. See Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 182 (4th Cir. 2016) (recognizing its
disagreement with other courts about the proper analysis of the
constitutionality of complete prohibitions on certain types of weapons).
193. See, e.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir.
2011) (Wilkinson, J., concurring)
There may or may not be a Second Amendment right in some places
beyond the home, but we have no idea what those places are, what
the criteria for selecting them should be, what sliding scales of
scrutiny might apply to them, or any one of a number of other
questions . . . . The whole matter strikes us as a vast terra incognita
that courts should enter only upon necessity and only then by small
degree.
See also United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010) (declining to
“get more deeply into the ‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire” than necessary to decide
the case in front of before it).
194. See infra Part VII (noting the crucial need for a new approach).
195. See infra notes 199–241 and accompanying text (discussing the Second
Amendment caselaw and its implications).
196. See infra Part IV (discussing the different paths the Court could take if
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Second Amendment enforcement issue. 197 Part VI will conclude
by suggesting that this approach may be more generally useful
when the Court confronts legislation enforcing other substantive
Fourteenth Amendment rights. 198
A. The Second Amendment’s Emerging Doctrinal Structure
Much of the difficulty courts have experienced in Second
Amendment cases stems from Heller’s identification of a “core”
right of law-abiding citizens to possess a gun for self-defense, 199
and its further observation that that right is “most acute” in the
home. 200 This identification of a Second Amendment “core”
logically implies the existence of a Second Amendment periphery
consisting of gun possession rights that are not part of the
amendment’s core, but nevertheless enjoy some degree of
constitutional protection. 201 Indeed, lower courts have recognized
not only such peripheral possession rights, but also penumbral
rights beyond mere possession. 202
This recognition of a Second Amendment core and periphery
has helped create a structure in which a given gun control law
may be subject to different levels of judicial scrutiny, depending
on how closely the regulations approach the heart of the Second
presented a Second Amendment question).
197. See infra Part V (discussing each step of the Second Amendment
analysis in greater detail).
198. See infra Part VI (discussing the enforcement of Fourteenth
Amendment rights more generally).
199. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) (stating
that a law preventing one from having the ability to protect his home is
unconstitutional); see also id. at 599 (defining self-defense as “the central
component” of the Second Amendment right).
200. See id. at 628 (describing the gun prohibition in the challenged law as
“extend[ing], moreover, to the home, where the need for defense of self, family,
and property is most acute”).
201. See Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2014)
(referencing passages from Heller that “alone, though short of dispositive,
strongly suggest that the Second Amendment secures a right to carry a firearm
in some fashion outside the home”); see also infra note 211 and accompanying
text (discussing protection in the home).
202. See generally Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011)
[hereinafter Ezell I] (protecting the right to access a firing range); Ezell v. City
of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Ezell II] (same).

1842

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1801 (2017)

Amendment right. That complex structure poses a difficult
enough challenge for any inquiry into whether a federal gun
rights enforcement law is congruent and proportional to the
underlying Second Amendment right. But the matter becomes
even more complicated when one realizes that these inquiries
require different interpretive methodologies. In turn, those
different methodologies relate in different ways to Congress’s
particular institutional capacities compared with those of
courts—and thus have different impacts on the latitude and
deference Congress should enjoy in enacting enforcement
legislation.
Consider one relatively common lower court approach to
Second Amendment issues in which the first step requires a
historical analysis of whether a particular gun possession right,
or the exercise of that right by a particular person, falls
completely outside the protection offered by the Second
Amendment. 203 For example, when considering whether domestic
violence misdemeanants enjoy the constitutional right to possess
a gun, a number of courts have examined whether historically
such persons had enjoyed that right. Some courts that answer
that question in the negative (that is, courts that have found that
historically such persons did not enjoy gun possession rights)
have stopped their analysis at that point. 204 By contrast, courts
concluding that such persons did in fact enjoy that right have
203. See Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2016) (describing
an approach starting with this scope inquiry as one adopted by a majority of the
federal circuit courts); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (describing this as the
“prevailing” approach); see also Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 703 (applying this analysis).
Cf. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1449–53 (noting a preliminary “scope” question in
Second Amendment cases, asking whether the asserted gun possession conduct
is entirely outside the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection); Rosenthal,
supra note 3, at 1200 (“[T]he first prong, while ostensibly focused on historical
evidence of original meaning, operates only to defeat Second Amendment
claims.”).
204. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010)
The first question [in Second Amendment analysis] is whether the
challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope
of the Second Amendment's guarantee. This historical inquiry seeks
to determine whether the conduct at issue was understood to be
within the scope of the right at the time of ratification. If it was not,
then the challenged law is valid.
(internal quotation and citation omitted).
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then applied some level of ends-means scrutiny, with the
intensity of that scrutiny often turning on the proximity of the
asserted right (now held to be within the Second Amendment’s
overall zone of protection) to the Amendment’s core. 205
The cases applying this approach reveal the existence of up
to five analytical steps, each of which is governed by a distinct
methodology. 206 The first step—determining whether the asserted
right comes within the Second Amendment’s protected zone at
all—appears to require a binary yes/no decision, reached, at least
in most cases, by a historical analysis. 207 The second step—
determining whether the challenged law constitutes a substantial
burden on the right 208—requires some degree of judgment from
205. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 195 (“[A] ‘severe burden on the core
Second Amendment right of armed self-defense should require a strong
justification,’ but . . . ‘laws that do not implicate the central self-defense concern
of the Second Amendment . . . may be more easily justified . . . .’” (quoting
Chester, 628 F.3d at 682)).
206. Courts have often described this approach as entailing simply two
steps—the “scope” inquiry the text identifies as the first step, and then the
selection and application of the appropriate scrutiny level, which courts often
describe as one step, but may include as many as four. See supra note 203
(citing examples).
207. See, e.g., Silvester, 843 F.3d at 821 (“Under [Ninth Circuit] case law,
the court in the first step asks if the challenged law burdens conduct protected
by the Second Amendment, based on a historical understanding of the scope of
the right.” (internal quotation omitted)). To be sure, courts have expressed
doubts about their ability to competently perform such an analysis, in part
because of the anachronistic nature of many of these questions. See, e.g., Allan
Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle Over the Second
Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 750 (2012) (“[R]ecognizing the difficulty
of making comparisons across centuries during which so many vast
technological, legal, social, and other changes have occurred.”); id. at 752 n.315
(citing cases acknowledging this problem in the context of laws restricting gun
rights for domestic violence misdemeanants); Chester, 628 F.3d at 680
(“Moreover, it appears to us that the historical data is not conclusive on the
question of whether the founding era understanding was that the Second
Amendment did not apply to felons.”); Carlton F.W. Lawson, Four Exceptions in
Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1376 (2009) (noting the difficulty of justifying an
originalist-based conclusion about the constitutionality of felon disarmament
laws); see also Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 704–06 (analyzing whether target range
regulation was a longstanding historical practice that immunized such
regulation from Second Amendment review); County of San Diego, 824 F.3d at
939 (using the same history-centered review when determining whether the
Second Amendment protected the right to carry a concealed weapon).
208. See Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 1202 (noting this inquiry).
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the court. A judge confronting this question would presumably
have to apply the empirical facts of the situation (literally, how
burdensome the regulation is) to a legal standard that might
draw its content from other constitutional rights doctrines that
impose an analogous requirement. 209 The third step—
determining the proximity of the asserted right to the Helleridentified Second Amendment “core” 210—also requires judgment.
Recall that Heller described the need for self-defense as “most
acute” in the home, thus, as one judge has written, “suggesting
that some form of the right applies where that need is not ‘most
acute.’” 211 Determining how to analyze claimed infringements of
that less central “form of the right” requires judges to make a
choice that is presumably not a binary one, unless (implausibly)
all rights other than home self-defense fall into the same category
with respect to their distance from Heller’s home-centered core.
Such a decision, then, inevitably requires a degree of sensitive
judgment, akin to locating a right on a sliding scale of importance
or fundamentality. 212 The fourth step—settling on the applicable
scrutiny level—presumably turns to a great degree on the
209. See Volokh, supra note 3, at 1454–55 (noting the existence of analogous
“burden” inquiries in other constitutional rights doctrines).
210. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) (“We must
also address the District’s requirement (as applied to respondent’s handgun)
that firearms in the home be rendered and kept inoperable at all times. This
makes it impossible for citizens to use them for the core lawful purpose of selfdefense and is hence unconstitutional.”).
211. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 2011)
(Niemeyer, J., writing separately) (“The Court stated that its holding applies to
the home, where the need ‘for defense of self, family, and property is most acute,’
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 (emphasis added), suggesting that some form of the
right applies where that need is not ‘most acute.’”). But see Peruta v. County of
San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2014) (suggesting that armed
self-defense is a core Second Amendment right wherever it occurs).
212. See, e.g., Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 821 (9th Cir. 2016) (using
sliding scale imagery to describe how to determine the appropriate standard of
review based on an estimation of the proximity of the claimed right to the
Second Amendment core and the severity of the burden); Ezell I, 651 F.3d 684,
708 (7th Cir. 2011)
[L]aws restricting activity lying closer to the margins of the Second
Amendment right, laws that merely regulate . . . and modest
burdens . . . may be more easily justified. How much more easily
depends on the relative severity of the burden and its proximity to the
core of the right.
(emphasis added).
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outcome of the third step—that is, on how the court characterizes
the right’s proximity to the core of the Second Amendment. 213
Finally, the fifth step—applying that scrutiny—involves
evaluating policy considerations about the importance of the
asserted government interests, the effectiveness of the law in
accomplishing those interests, and the availability of alternative
means of attaining those interests. 214
B. Second Amendment Doctrine and Congressional Enforcement
Power
These steps thus reflect a variety of decision-making
methodologies: historical inquiries seeking a yes/no answer to the
protected status of gun possession conduct, judgments about the
severity of the burden a law places on a claimed right and about
the proximity of particular conduct to the core conduct the Second
Amendment protects, doctrinal decisions about the appropriate
level of scrutiny to apply, and policy-laden analysis applying the
scrutiny level ultimately chosen. 215 The sheer range of these
approaches alone would seriously complicate a court’s
examination into whether a federal gun rights enforcement
statute was congruent and proportional to the underlying right it
213. See Silvester, 843 F.3d at 821 (using sliding scale imagery); Ezell I, 651
F.3d at 708 (describing the appropriate standard of review in that particular
case as “more rigorous . . . than that applied” in an earlier Second Amendment
case, “if not quite ‘strict scrutiny’”).
214. Indeed, such analysis could come quite close to the “interest balancing”
Justice Scalia criticized in Heller. See Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 710 (concluding that
“the [challenged] firing-range ban is wholly out of proportion to the public
interests the City claims it serves”).
215. Cf. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1446 (proposing that courts adopt a
three-step test: (1) a scope inquiry; (2) an inquiry into the burden level the
regulation imposes on the right; and (3) an inquiry into the “danger reduction”
the regulation accomplishes, which roughly tracks, respectively, steps one, two
to three, and four to five in the text); Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 1200–01
(describing “the prevailing approach” as involving a “two-pronged inquiry”—an
initial scope inquiry followed by the application of “an appropriate form of
means-end scrutiny” (citations omitted)); id. at 1201 (identifying that second
prong as involving “two analytically distinct steps, in which, first, the extent of
the burden on the right of lawful, armed defense is assessed in order to
determine, then, the extent to which the challenged regulation will be regarded
as constitutionally suspect” (citations omitted)).
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sought to protect. But the problem is even more serious than
that. If a court’s performance of congruence and proportionality
review seeks to account for Congress’s institutional strengths in
making particular types of determinations, 216 that review would
have to take several different forms in the process of analyzing
the same enforcement statute.
Yet another complexity also bears noting before we apply this
approach to the enforcement power. The Court’s decisions in
Kimel 217 and Garrett, 218 to accord skeptical scrutiny to
enforcement legislation because the law in question protected a
non-suspect class, are subject to the criticism that it elevates
suspect class analysis, and the tiered scrutiny that follows, from
the status of mere decisional heuristic to constitutional law. Both
judges 219 and scholars 220 have observed that suspect class
analysis, and in particular the deference the rational basis
standard shows to legislation burdening groups that fall under
the default “non-suspect” category, reflects judicial restraint
rather than core constitutional meaning. Those critics observe
that such judicial restraint may be admirable, but does not
justify cabining congressional power, given the character of
216. I have argued elsewhere that congruence and proportionality review
should in fact take account of Congress’s particular institutional capabilities,
and how those capabilities allow Congress to provide appropriate and
meaningful input to the task of vindicating constitutional rights. See ARAIZA,
ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 258 (arguing for incorporating congressional
institutional capacities to bolster Congress’s role in constitutional rights
vindication); see also William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Factfinding
in Rights-Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 882
(2013) [hereinafter Araiza, Deference] (explaining the particular types of
legislative findings in rights-protecting legislation that merit the most and the
least judicial deference).
217. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 63 (2000) (applying
skeptical review in the age discrimination context).
218. See Bd. of Trs. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 357 (2001) (applying
skeptical review in a case brought under the ADA).
219. See id. at 382–84 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Rational-basis review—with
its presumptions favoring constitutionality—is ‘a paradigm of judicial
restraint.’” (emphasis added) (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S.
307, 314 (1993))).
220. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Segal, Legislative Constitutionalism and
Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretations of the Family and Medical Leave
Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1967 (2003) (discussing judicial reluctance to “closely
scrutinize legislative choices” as a reflection of rational basis review as judicial
restraint).
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rational basis review, and suspect class analysis more generally,
as a decisional heuristic motivated by concerns about
institutional competence rather than a statement of core
constitutional meaning. 221 As a result, congruence and
proportionality review focused on the results of suspect class
analysis—that is, the review performed by the Court in the
Kimel/Garrett/Hibbs trilogy—ends up testing enforcement
legislation for congruence and proportionality against the wrong
referent—the benefitted group’s suspect class status—rather
than core constitutional meaning itself. 222
For our purposes, this critique means that before the Second
Amendment doctrinal steps noted earlier become relevant to
enforcement legislation, they must be evaluated to determine
whether they constitute core constitutional law as opposed to
mere decisional heuristics. This is not a novel distinction. Nearly
thirty years ago, Lawrence Sager’s classic article on
underenforced constitutional norms distinguished between
“institutional” and “analytical” justifications for judicial decisions
enforcing rights. 223 According to Dean Sager, court decisions
relying on concerns about institutional competence to justify
narrow readings of rights result in rights that should be
considered judicially underenforced, and thus appropriately
subject to additional protection by other actors, including
Congress when it uses its Enforcement Clause authority. 224 By
contrast, “analytical” reasons for reading a right narrowly relate
to the Court’s “understanding of the [constitutional] concept
itself.” 225 The results of such latter analyses were, in Dean
Sager’s view, less susceptible to supplementation by other actors,
221. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 8, at 21 n.95 (citing scholars making a
similar argument).
222. I have made this argument in other venues. For this discussion, see
ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 141–69.
223. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1217–18 (1978)
(“What I want to distinguish between here are reasons for limiting a judicial
construct of a constitutional concept which are based upon questions of
propriety or capacity and those which are based upon an understanding of the
concept itself.”).
224. See id. at 1228–42 (discussing cases in which the underenforcement
thesis is properly applied).
225. Id. at 1218.
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at least when such supplementation was performed under the
banner of enforcing or vindicating that right. 226 While he wrote
two decades before Boerne and Boerne’s application to equal
protection enforcing legislation, Dean Sager’s distinction
foreshadowed both judicial and scholarly critiques of the Court’s
skeptical review of such legislation. 227
Dean Sager’s institutional/analytical distinction requires
that we consider the degree to which the Second Amendment is
judicially “underenforced” and thus appropriately susceptible to
aggressive congressional supplementation via the Enforcement
Clause. 228 Unfortunately, the complexity of Second Amendment
doctrine means that this inquiry does not always yield an
unambiguous answer. Sometimes the inquiry is straightforward.
Most notably, the first step in Second Amendment analysis—
whether, as a historical matter, particular gun possession
conduct was understood as protected by the Second
Amendment—is answered (at least ostensibly 229) by an analysis
that relies heavily on constitutional text and originalist
analysis. 230 Without engaging the ongoing, well-known, and
voluminously-documented debate about the merits of originalism,
or whether it constitutes the only legitimate approach to
constitutional interpretation, 231 the fact that originalist analysis
226. See id. at 1240 (“[W]here, because of analytical . . . concerns, the Court
has determined that given conduct does no violence to the substantive norm of
the fourteenth amendment, Congress cannot use section 5 as authority to
legislate against that conduct.”).
227. See Bd. of Trs. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 382–85 (2001) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (critiquing the Court’s application of rational-basis review);
William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of
Equal Protection, 79 TUL. L. REV. 519, 525–26 (2005) (arguing that the Court’s
Equal Protection Clause decisions under rational-basis review reflect the same
distinction Dean Sager drew).
228. See supra note 224 and accompanying text (discussing the
underenforcement thesis as applied to specific cases).
229. See supra note 207 (citing sources conceding the difficulty courts have
encountered reaching reliable conclusions under such analysis).
230. See, e.g., Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 821 (9th Cir. 2016)
(discussing examination of historical evidence and historical understanding as
the first step in determining a challenged law’s burden on conduct protected by
the Second Amendment).
231. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991)
(noting a variety of “modalities,” or tools, of constitutional interpretation).
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self-consciously aims at uncovering the core law of the
Constitution suggests that this first doctrinal step is not a
decisional heuristic. 232 To use Dean Sager’s terminology, this first
doctrinal step relies on “analytical” reasoning rather than
concerns about courts’ “institutional” limitations. 233 As such, the
room for congressional supplementation is correspondingly
narrowed. As set out below, other doctrinal steps may not have
that status. Thus, Congress may enjoy more latitude to
contribute to courts’ resolution of those latter steps.
Consider an example illustrating the methodological variety
of these steps. Hypothesize a federal law that protects the rights
of Americans to carry loaded guns in their automobiles. A
defender of that law’s constitutionality as “appropriate”
legislation enforcing the Second Amendment 234 might first argue
that carriage of a gun in a car, by analogy to historical
antecedents, comes within the protection of the Second
Amendment. 235 She might then argue that the federal
enforcement statute protects against state laws that completely
prohibit, or at least severely restrict, such carriage, and thus that
the federal law protects against substantial burdens on the
Second Amendment right.
That same person might then argue that the prevalence of
automobile travel today, and the nature of one’s automobile as a
fundamentally private space, render the need for self-defense
while traveling only slightly less “acute” than Heller’s core home
self-defense right. 236 She might then argue that the importance of
232. See Scalia, supra note 11, at 854
Central to [Chief Justice Marshall’s defense of judicial review in
Marbury v. Madison] . . . is the perception that the Constitution . . . is
in its nature the sort of “law” that is the business of the courts—an
enactment that has a fixed meaning ascertainable through the usual
devices familiar to those learned in the law.
(emphasis added).
233. See Sager, supra note 223, at 1218 (noting the analytical framework).
234. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (authorizing Congress to enact
“appropriate” legislation enforcing Fourteenth Amendment rights).
235. Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (considering a
somewhat analogous question in the context of the Fourth Amendment).
236. For a provocative examination of the role of the automobile as a locus
for intensely private pursuits, see generally Sara Seo, The New Public, 125 YALE
L.J. 1616 (2016).
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that right justifies its careful protection from state regulation,
i.e., that such state regulation should trigger strict scrutiny—a
result that, in turn, would give Congress more leeway to enforce
that right, at least under the Court’s existing enforcement power
template. 237 Finally, she could argue, as part of the ultimate
review of the law for congruence and proportionality, that
Congress merits deference when it makes determinations about
the social reality of both the safety risks of driving (for example,
long-distance driving through sparsely populated areas or
sleeping in one’s car) and, conversely, the public safety risks of
loaded guns in cars.
The point is not so much that each of these steps would
present courts with a challenge—although each one surely would.
Rather, the main point is that the focus of congruence and
proportionality review would have to continually shift, as the
methodology for judging the enforcement statute shifted with
each step in the analytical sequence outlined above. Further, as
the methodology shifted, the deference due Congress’s
determinations would similarly shift, as the character of courts’
analysis moves (to use Dean Sager’s terminology) between
analytical and institutional. For example, a court might well
conclude that Congress’s conclusion about the historical pedigree
of unrestricted carriage of weapons did not merit any particular
deference, since that would be a conclusion about historical
practice, a topic about which Congress does not enjoy any
particular expertise or authority relative to courts. Indeed, to the
extent originalist analysis purports to uncover core constitutional
meaning based on Dean Sager’s “analytical” reasoning, a court
decision allowing Congress to make the relevant originalist
determinations about the scope of a constitutional right would
237. See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003)
(concluding that the heightened protection accorded sex equality under the
Fourteenth Amendment made it “easier for Congress to show a pattern of state
constitutional violations” justifying enforcement legislation); id. at 735
(comparing its review of sex equality-enforcement legislation with legislation
enforcing the equal protection rights of non-suspect classes, and concluding that
the non-suspect nature of the benefitted classes imposed on Congress a tougher
evidentiary burden when seeking to justify that latter type of legislation); see
also supra note 134 (citing authorities describing the Court’s Enforcement
Clause jurisprudence as applied to equality-enforcing legislation as turning
heavily on the suspect class status of the group that legislation seeks to protect).
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essentially cede to Congress the power to declare such core
meaning, in contravention of Boerne. 238 By contrast, its
conclusions about the acuteness of the need for self-defense while
driving might well merit deference, given Congress’s presumed
superior knowledge of, and ability to draw conclusions about,
social reality in 21st-century America. 239
This very quick discussion of the automobile carriage
hypothetical does not even begin to provide a complete analysis of
the implications of Second Amendment doctrine for congressional
attempts to enforce gun possession rights. More comprehensive
analyses of Congress’s power to enforce the Second Amendment
follow in Parts IV and V. 240 What this brief discussion illustrates,
however, is the variety and complexity of the questions that
underlying doctrine poses for the enforcement power. 241 The
prospect of enforcement legislation protecting Second
Amendment rights, and the possibility of enforcement legislation
protecting substantive Fourteenth Amendment rights more
generally, demands an approach to the enforcement power
question that accounts for this variety and complexity.
IV. Arming the Second Amendment: Existing Approaches
Given the little that we know so far about the Supreme
Court’s approach to Second Amendment adjudication, what
doctrinal paths would present themselves should the Court
confront legislation enforcing Second Amendment rights? Part
II’s discussion of the Court’s Enforcement Clause jurisprudence
suggests some possibilities. 242 However, those possibilities are
238. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (stating that
Congress’s passage of the RFRA was an “attempt [to] change . . . constitutional
protections” rather than remedial or preventive legislation).
239. See ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 169–93 (arguing that
Congress’s superior understanding of contemporary social reality should trigger
judicial deference to congressional determinations based on such
understanding).
240. See infra Parts IV, V (applying existing approaches to the enforcement
power to Second Amendment issues and offering a new approach).
241. See supra Part III (noting the variety and complexity of questions posed
by underlying Second Amendment doctrine).
242. See supra Part II (discussing the Court’s extant Enforcement Clause
doctrine).
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complicated by the doctrinal approaches adopted in part by the
Heller Court and by the lower courts charged with applying
Heller to different types of regulations, as discussed in Part III. 243
This Part of this Article re-examines those possibilities in light of
the complexities of Second Amendment doctrine. 244 Part V offers
another approach to Congress’s power to enforce the Second
Amendment, and, by analogy, its power to enforce other
Fourteenth Amendment substantive rights provisions. 245
A. The Equal Protection/Tiered Scrutiny Approach
An important part of the Court’s post-Boerne Enforcement
Clause jurisprudence consists of the Kimel/Garrett/Hibbs trilogy
of equal protection enforcement cases. 246 In those cases the Court
adopted strong presumptions disfavoring or favoring enforcement
legislation
based
on,
respectively,
the
presumptive
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the conduct that
legislation targets. 247 For example, as discussed in more detail in
Part II, in Garrett, the Court’s skeptical enforcement power
review of the ADA’s employment provisions flowed largely from
what the Court described as the constitutionally trivial status of
disability discrimination. 248 By contrast, two years later in Hibbs,
243. See supra Part III (identifying the approaches to Second Amendment
questions taken by lower courts).
244. See infra notes 246–341 (reexamining the Second Amendment
Enforcement Clause issue in light of underlying Second Amendment doctrine).
245. See infra Part V (offering a new, more granular, approach to
Enforcement Clause doctrine).
246. This Article does not extensively discuss Morrison, given its primary
focus on the fact that the VAWA did not directly regulate states. See United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000) (“Section 13981 is also different
from these previously upheld remedies in that it applies uniformly throughout
the Nation. Congress’[s] findings indicate that the problem of discrimination
against the victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all States, or
even most States.”).
247. See supra notes 103–133 and accompanying text (discussing the Kimel,
Garrett, and Hibbs decisions); see also Massey, supra note 8, 9–14 (embracing
the methodology in those three cases as a general approach to enforcement
power cases); Lee, supra note 180, at 488–89 (embracing that methodology).
248. See Bd. of Trs. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) (“The
legislative record of the ADA . . . simply fails to show that Congress did in fact
identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the
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the Court’s far more hospitable reception to the FMLA’s familycare leave provision largely stemmed from the Court’s recognition
that sex discrimination poses a serious constitutional concern. 249
As the Court stated in Hibbs, the more serious constitutional
question sex discrimination poses made it “easier for Congress to
show a pattern of state constitutional violations.” 250
Judges and scholars have critiqued the Court’s heavy
reliance on suspect class analysis in its enforcement power
jurisprudence, arguing that the results of such analysis
constitute judicial heuristics rather than core constitutional
law. 251 As explained earlier, 252 congruence and proportionality
review focused on the results of suspect class analysis—that is,
the review performed by the Court in the Kimel/Garrett/Hibbs
trilogy—ends up testing enforcement legislation for congruence
and proportionality against the wrong referent—the benefitted
group’s suspect class status—rather than core constitutional
meaning itself. 253 To return to Dean Sager’s terminology, 254 when
such heuristics take the form of deferential rational basis review,
the resulting institutional competence-motivated judicial
restraint is best understood as resulting in an underenforced
constitutional norm. In turn, that underenforcement leaves room
for appropriate exercises of other branches’ powers to more fully
vindicate that norm. 255
This critique is partially moot in the case of the Second
Amendment. In Heller, the Court downplayed reliance on
heuristics such as tiered scrutiny, in favor of direct, unmediated
disabled.”).
249. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003) (“The
impact of the discrimination targeted by the FMLA is significant.”).
250. Id.
251. See Massey, supra note 8, at 21 n.95 (citing scholars making a similar
argument).
252. See supra notes 219–222 and accompanying text (discussing rational
basis review and judicial restraint as it relates to suspect class analysis).
253. See supra note 222 and accompanying text (providing other venues in
which the same argument is made).
254. See supra notes 223–224 and accompanying text (discussing Dean
Sager’s underenforcement thesis).
255. See supra note 224 (discussing the underenforcement thesis as applied
to specific cases).
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examination of the core constitutional right. 256 That search for
core constitutional meaning led the majority to conclude that the
Second Amendment—on its own, unmediated by decision rules
such as suspect class analysis—protected the right of law-abiding
citizens to possess a commonly-owned type of functioning gun for
self-defense purposes in the home. 257 Because the challenged
District of Columbia law prevented such possession, 258 the Court
found it to violate the core meaning of the Second Amendment. 259
To be sure, lower courts after Heller have not been able to
avoid tiered scrutiny analysis as easily as Heller itself, given that
they have had to confront gun restrictions that did not destroy
the core right as Justice Scalia described it. 260 Nevertheless,
tiered scrutiny in Second Amendment cases may differ from its
equal protection cousin in not being based on judicial heuristics.
In particular, courts in Second Amendment cases have decided to
apply such scrutiny not based on any mediating principle such as
political process analysis, but instead as a reflection of the impact
of the law on core Second Amendment values. 261 Thus, tiered
scrutiny analysis in Second Amendment cases may in fact have a
closer connection to core constitutional law than in the equal
protection context, even if it still reflects the “interest balancing”
Justice Scalia derided in Heller. 262 For that reason, court
256. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579–605 (2008)
(examining the constitutional meaning of the Second Amendment by examining
the operative clause, prefatory clause, their meanings, and the relationship
between the clauses).
257. See id. at 573–636 (using the meaning of the Second Amendment to
support the right of citizens to own and possess a firearm for self-defense).
258. The law struck down in Heller prohibited the possession of handguns in
the home and required that lawfully possessed guns (such as long guns) kept in
the home be kept in a dissembled state, so as to render them non-functional. Id.
at 575.
259. See id. at 635 (“In sum, we hold that the District’s ban on handgun
possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition
against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of
immediate self-defense.”).
260. See Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 1203–04 (noting the prevalence of
“interest-balancing” in post-Heller lower court litigation).
261. See Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 821 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining
that the level of scrutiny in such non-core cases turns on the proximity of the
infringed-upon right to the Second Amendment’s core and the challenged law’s
degree of intrusion into that right).
262. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“The Second Amendment is no different
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decisions about the relevant scrutiny level may reflect less
underenforcement of the Second Amendment right than
analogous decisions in equal protection cases. 263 Thus, such
Second Amendment decisions may leave relatively less room for
aggressive enforcement legislation, as compared with the
situation with equal protection. 264
But another, more practical, problem arises when we
consider the utility of Second Amendment tiered scrutiny to the
enforcement power question. In the decade since Heller, courts
considering Second Amendment claims have often selected
intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard. 265 This causes
not a conceptual problem like the one identified above, but
rather, an indeterminacy problem. Put bluntly, in comparison to
rational basis or strict scrutiny review, intermediate scrutiny (at
least in its classic incarnation 266) provides far less of a predictable
thumb on the scale either favoring or disfavoring the
That
constitutionality
of
enforcement
legislation. 267
indeterminacy would likely be particularly pronounced in the
Second Amendment context, given that such scrutiny is triggered
[from the First Amendment]. Like the First, it is the very product of an interest
balancing by the people—which Justice Breyer would now conduct for them
anew.”).
263. See Sager, supra note 223, at 1218, 1228–42 (discussing the
underenforcement thesis and the difference in “institutional” and “analytical”
reasons for examining rights).
264. See id. (examining the need for other actors to supplement
constitutional rights based on the Court’s use of analytical versus institutional
readings of rights).
265. See Silvester, 843 F.3d at 827 (using intermediate scrutiny in analyzing
a law regulating firearm use and ownership); see also United States v. Hosford,
843 F.3d 161, 168–70 (4th Cir. 2016) (same).
266. By “classic incarnation,” I mean the formulation which self-consciously
locates itself “between [the] extremes of rational basis and strict scrutiny,”
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1986), rather than the version espoused in
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 571–72 (1996) (citing Jeter), which has
been described as a type of proto-strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Kevin Rolando, A
Decade Later: United States v. Virginia and the Rise and Fall of “Skeptical
Scrutiny,” 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 182, 182–85 (2006) (labeling the
Court’s use of a toughened intermediate scrutiny in United States v. Virginia as
more akin to strict scrutiny).
267. See, e.g., Kimberly Jenkins, Constitutional Lessons for the Next
Generation of Public Single-Sex Elementary and Secondary Schools, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1953, 1997–98 (2006) (citing and discussing scholars’
characterizations of intermediate scrutiny as indeterminate).
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by infringements on gun rights that are conceded to be peripheral
to the core right Heller recognized, but which nevertheless enjoy
meaningful constitutional protection. 268 It is thus difficult to see
how courts’ use of intermediate scrutiny predictably influences
the outcome of a congruence and proportionality analysis, in the
way that the Court’s use of rational basis scrutiny for age and
disability discrimination effectively doomed the enforcement
power argument for, respectively, the ADEA in Kimel and the
ADA in Garrett, and in the way that employment of heightened
scrutiny for sex discrimination 269 effectively paved the way for
the Court’s approval of the FMLA in Hibbs. 270
B. The Due Process Approach
The Court’s due process enforcement cases may provide a
more promising approach to the Court’s evaluation of Second
Amendment enforcement legislation. Indeed, focusing on those
cases makes intuitive sense, given that a plurality of the Court
found that the Due Process Clause provided the appropriate
doctrinal home for an incorporated Second Amendment. 271 Since
268. See, e.g., Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 692–99
(6th Cir. 2016) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a federal law denying a gun
license to anyone who had ever been committed to a mental institution, and
finding that application of that law to the plaintiff failed that level of scrutiny).
269. To repeat a point made earlier, while sex discrimination ostensibly
receives the same “intermediate scrutiny,” the accompanying text describes as
providing only indeterminate guidance for the congruence and proportionality
inquiry; by the time Hibbs was decided sex discrimination had been treated by
the Court in a way that suggested not “classic” intermediate scrutiny, but rather
something approaching strict scrutiny. See supra note 266 and accompanying
text (discussing differences between a “classic” version of intermediate scrutiny
and a more toughened version similar to strict scrutiny). Thus, that level of
scrutiny did in fact provide significant guidance for the Court in Hibbs, even
while I suggest that “classic” intermediate scrutiny may not provide similar
guidance in the Second Amendment context.
270. See Lee, supra note 180, at 496–97 (concluding that, in the context of
congressional enforcement of rights that receive intermediate scrutiny, the
congruence and proportionality standard requires an assessment of fit, but
suggesting that such an assessment lacks clear standards).
271. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758–59 (2010) (plurality
opinion) (arguing for the use of the Due Process Clause in analyzing Fourteenth
Amendment protections of state infringement of Second Amendment rights); id.
at 805–06 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
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Boerne, the Court has decided four cases involving federal
legislation defended as enforcing Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights. 272 In reverse chronological order, those cases are
Georgia, 273 Lane, 274 Florida Prepaid, 275 and Boerne 276 itself.
1. Georgia
The most recent of these cases, United States v. Georgia, 277
can be dispensed with quickly. In Georgia, the Court
unanimously agreed that, whatever else Congress might be able
to accomplish through the enforcement power, it unquestionably
could legislate judicial remedies for state conduct that actually
violates the Fourteenth Amendment. In a sense, that holding is
trivial. 278 Particularly in the Second Amendment context, a
holding that Congress has the power to legislate remedies for
judicially-found constitutional violations says very little about the
(discussing the Privileges and Immunities Clause as a more appropriate
authority to protect Second Amendment rights).
272. See infra Part IV.A.1–3 (examining the cases and their implications).
273. See infra note 277 (discussing Georgia).
274. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing Lane).
275. See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing Florida Prepaid).
276. See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing Boerne).
277. 546 U.S. 151 (2006). For details on the case, see supra note 153 and
accompanying text (discussing whether the ADA’s provision of money damages
for violations of the public services provision constituted appropriate
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause when applied
to conduct that was alleged to have violated the Due Process Clause).
278. Indeed, it is telling that the Court was unanimous in Georgia, despite
having split badly on every other enforcement power case after Boerne. See id.
While the Members of this Court have disagreed regarding the scope
of Congress’s ‘prophylactic’ enforcement powers under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . no one doubts that § 5 grants Congress
the power to ‘enforce . . . the provisions’ of the Amendment by
creating private remedies against the States for actual violations of
those provisions.
(citations omitted). It may also be telling that the Court’s brief opinion
upholding this use of the enforcement power was written by Justice Scalia, who
by 2006 had gone on record as taking the most restrictive view of that power of
all the justices. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 554 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (repudiating the congruence and proportionality test and, with the
exception of racial equality legislation, limiting Congress to enacting remedies
for actual judicially-decreed Fourteenth Amendment violations).
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potential scope of congressional power, given the vagueness and
uncertainty of current Second Amendment doctrine. That
vagueness and uncertainty potentially opens up significant room
for congressional participation in the project of vindicating
Second Amendment rights—but only if we can conclude both that
that vagueness reflects courts’ institutional competence-derived
hesitancy in stating clearer rules and that Congress possesses the
expertise or authority to provider clearer guidance.
That uncertainty—and hence, the potential for more robust
congressional power—arises most explicitly in the context of gun
regulations that implicate something other than the core Heller
right to law-abiding citizens’ self-defense in the home via the use
of weapons commonly employed for that purpose. As Part III
noted, regulations going beyond that narrow description trigger
judicial scrutiny that potentially involves a sequence of varied
analytical approaches. 279 As it also noted, some of those
approaches may be resistant to meaningful congressional
input. 280 Others, however, implicate empirical data and policy
analysis that might well benefit from the input Congress is
well-suited to provide. 281 Indeed, to the extent that sequence of
analysis ultimately ends with a seemingly ad hoc reweighing of
the costs and benefits of regulation under the guise of
intermediate scrutiny, congressional input could be particularly
useful.
2. Lane
The remaining due process cases go beyond Georgia’s
minimalist endorsement of enforcement legislation that simply
provides remedies for judge-found constitutional violations. 282
279. See supra Part III (reviewing the analytical approaches).
280. See supra Part III (explaining how some of these approaches may not
be amenable to congressional input).
281. Cf. Michael McConnell, Institutions and Interpretations: A Critique of
City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 184–92 (1997) (arguing that
Congress is institutionally well-suited to contribute to the interpretation of
constitutional provisions to the extent that interpretation rests on empirical or
policy judgments).
282. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (“But just as Georgia states
an unremarkable proposition of Enforcement Clause doctrine, it adds little to
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These cases pose the question whether one can apply the
congruence and proportionality test in a way that allows a
meaningful role for Congress to enact prophylactic rules of
conduct while respecting Boerne’s insistence on judicial
superiority in stating constitutional meaning. 283
The first logical candidate for this inquiry is Lane. 284 Most of
Lane is devoted to presenting evidence of state deprivations of the
particular right at issue—the right of disabled persons to access
the judicial process 285—and defending its decision to evaluate the
ADA’s public services provision as applied to that particular
right. 286 But for our purposes its most helpful component is its
comparison of the ADA (as applied to the courthouse access right)
with the doctrinal test that the Court uses to decide claims of
unconstitutional denial of that access. 287 In performing that
comparison, the Court noted the similarity between the ADA’s
“reasonable accommodation” requirement and the underlying
constitutional doctrine’s requirement that, “‘within the limits of
practicability, a State must afford to all individuals a meaningful
opportunity to be heard’ in its courts.” 288 After considering
applications of that constitutional standard, 289 it concluded that,
just as with the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement,
“[e]ach of [those constitutional] cases makes clear that ordinary
the far more nuanced issues discussed in other post-Boerne cases.”).
283. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (stating that the
RFRA “contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers
and the federal balance” and that the Court’s precedent must control).
284. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 527 (applying the congruence and proportionality
test).
285. See id. at 527 (“With respect to the particular services at issue in this
case, Congress learned that many individuals, in many States across the
country, were being excluded from courthouses and court proceedings by reason
of their disabilities.”).
286. See id. at 531 (“Congress’[s] chosen remedy for the pattern of exclusion
and discrimination described above . . . is congruent and proportional to its
object of enforcing the right of access to the courts.”).
287. See id. at 532 (“[The ADA’s] duty to accommodate is perfectly consistent
with the well-established due process principle that, ‘within the limits of
practicability, a State must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to
be heard’ in its courts.” (citation omitted)).
288. Id. at 532 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
289. See id. at 532–33 (examining cases in which the constitutional standard
has been applied).
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considerations of cost and convenience alone cannot justify a
State’s failure to provide individuals with a meaningful right of
access to the courts.” 290 Thus, the Court concluded:
Judged against this backdrop, [the ADA’s] affirmative
obligation to accommodate persons with disabilities in the
administration of justice cannot be said to be so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it
cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior. It is, rather, a reasonable
prophylactic measure, reasonably targeted to a legitimate
end. 291

Applying this approach 292 to the Second Amendment is
helpful only to the extent that Second Amendment doctrine can
be stated in a sufficiently clear and determinate way that it
provides the same kind of clear reference point for congruence
and proportionality analysis that the doctrinal test for judicial
access rights provided in Lane. 293 Unfortunately, Second
Amendment doctrine is not that straightforward. 294 As Part III
explained, Second Amendment cases often require a sequence of
analytical steps featuring different methodologies. 295 To make
290. Id. at 533.
291. Id. (footnote, citations, and internal quotations omitted).
292. For the sake of clarity, note that Lane’s approach is similar to, but
nevertheless distinct from, the tiered scrutiny approach associated with the
post-Boerne Court’s equal protection-based enforcement power doctrine,
discussed in the prior section of this Article. See supra Part IV (discussing
examples of the tiered scrutiny approach in Kimel, Garrett, and Hibbs). The
tiered scrutiny approach focuses on the three tiers of judicial equal protection
scrutiny—rationality, intermediate, and strict—and how those tiers can inform
Enforcement Clause questions. By contrast, Lane’s approach focuses on the
particular doctrinal test governing the underlying constitutional right that the
enforcement legislation seeks to vindicate. Such a doctrinal test could
conceivably be expressed as one of the tiered scrutiny levels normally associated
with equal protection, or it could be a completely sui generis test, as in Lane
itself. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 532 (2004) (describing the judicial
test for evaluating infringements on the right to access the court system).
293. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 531 (establishing that Congress’s objective of
enforcing the right of access to courts is congruent and proportional to
Congress’s remedy for violations of that objective).
294. See supra notes 246–256 and accompanying text (discussing these
methodologies for examining congruence and proportionality in the Second
Amendment context).
295. See supra notes 246–256 and accompanying text (discussing that the
range in the methodological approaches can make a court’s examination more
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matters worse, many Second Amendment cases end with an
application of a hazy balancing of the gun possession right with
the government’s interest, often labeled “intermediate
scrutiny.” 296 To be sure, this characterization of Second
Amendment doctrine is not necessarily a criticism; there may be
good reasons for both courts’ multi-step/methodologically-varied
approach and the intermediate scrutiny that often constitutes its
last step. But both components of this description make it
conceptually difficult—if not all-but impossible—to simply do
what Lane did: place the challenged enforcement statute
alongside the judicial doctrine governing the underlying
constitutional right, and determine whether the first is
sufficiently similar to the second that one can pronounce the
congruence and proportionality test either satisfied or unmet. 297
The ambivalent state of Second Amendment doctrine thus
suggests that courts will often lack clear doctrinal guideposts for
performing congruence and proportionality review of gun rights
legislation. This is not always the case: if nothing else, Heller’s
identification of a core Second Amendment right strongly
suggests that enforcement legislation directly vindicating that
core right should receive a favorable judicial reception. But even
this statement requires qualification: for example, query whether
a court would accord such a favorable reception to an enforcement
statute that removed what courts might consider a trivial burden
on that core right. 298 Leaving aside such details, the larger point
remains: once we get past enforcement legislation vindicating
core Second Amendment rights, congruence and proportionality
analysis becomes murky in direct relation to the degree that
underlying Second Amendment doctrine becomes incapable of
either expression as a clear statement or a relatively
straightforward application.
difficult and complicated).
296. See supra notes 269–270 and accompanying text (describing as unclear
the balancing of the right to the government’s interest).
297. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 532–33 (comparing the ADA with the judicial
doctrinal test).
298. Compare Volokh, supra note 3, at 1483–87 (suggesting that bans on
“assault weapons” might be constitutional given the continued availability of
similar types of weapons), with Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 181–82 (4th Cir.
2016) (applying strict scrutiny to a state prohibition on possessing a particular
type of weapon).
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3. Boerne and Florida Prepaid

The difficulties that attend congruence and proportionality
analysis as performed in Lane—that is, analysis keyed to judicial
doctrine governing the underlying right 299—should lead us to
consider other approaches to congruence and proportionality
review. One alternative would have the Court focus on the factual
support Congress amassed in favor of the enforcement statute.
The Court took this path in Boerne 300 itself, as well as in Florida
Prepaid, 301 the second Enforcement Clause case decided during
the congruence and proportionality era.
In Boerne, the Court focused its inquiry in part on whether
Congress had amassed an adequate factual record demonstrating
widespread state violations of the underlying First Amendment
right as the Court described it—that is, the right to be free of
government action motivated by religious bigotry. 302 Examining
the legislative record, the Court concluded that Congress had
found little, if any, evidence of the constitutionally-prohibited
conduct. 303 Similarly, in Florida Prepaid, the Court’s primary
objection to the federal patent rights protection law was the lack
299. See supra note 292 and accompanying text (discussing Lane’s
approach).
300. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (discussing the
RFRA’s legislative record’s lack of examples of modern laws passed because of
religious bigotry and comparing to the Voting Rights Act legislative record).
301. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999) (“Unlike the . . . record of racial discrimination
confronting Congress in the voting rights cases . . . Congress came up with little
evidence of infringing conduct on the part of the States.” (citation omitted)).
302. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535 (describing the underlying Free Exercise
right in these terms).
303. See id. at 530–32 (finding no support of widespread violations of the
Free Exercise Clause in the legislative record). To be sure, Boerne also worried
that RFRA’s broad liability rule was simply disproportionate to the underlying
constitutional rule as expressed in Smith. See id. at 532–35 (noting the
disproportionality with the rule); see also Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639
RFRA failed to meet [the congruence and proportionality] test
because there was little support in the record for the concerns that
supposedly animated the law. And . . . RFRA’s provisions were so out
of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that RFRA
could not be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior.
(citation and internal quotations omitted).
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of a factual record of widespread state conduct depriving patent
holders’ property rights without due process. 304
This focus on facts has the benefit of redirecting the Court’s
attention away from examining how closely a challenged
enforcement statute tracks the judicial doctrine governing the
underlying right Congress seeks to vindicate. Thus, it promises to
avoid, or at least reduce, the problem that arises when Congress
seeks to enforce a right that is governed by either an
indeterminate doctrinal test such as intermediate scrutiny 305 or
an intricate doctrinal structure that makes such a comparison
highly complex, 306 both of which characterize Second Amendment
doctrine. It also promises to focus the Court’s attention where, as
an institutional matter, Congress can perhaps play a particularly
helpful role: the finding of broad social facts that bear on the
extent to which a judicially-recognized right is being violated. 307
Unfortunately, this approach to enforcement power review,
just like the approach in Lane, is viable only if the underlying
constitutional rights doctrine is reasonably clear. The Boerne
Court had in front of it a constitutional right—the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise right—that, as the Court explained
304. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640 (“In enacting the Patent Remedy
Act . . . Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let
alone a pattern of constitutional violations.”); id. at 642 (“Though patents may
be considered ‘property’ for purposes of our analysis, the legislative record still
provides little support for the proposition that Congress sought to remedy a
Fourteenth Amendment violation in enacting the Patent Remedy Act.”); id. at
645 (“The legislative record thus suggests that the Patent Remedy Act does not
respond to a history of ‘widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional
rights’ of the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic § 5
legislation.”).
305. See supra notes 265–270 and accompanying text (reviewing examples of
intermediate scrutiny analysis).
306. See supra Part III (discussing Second Amendment doctrine).
307. This optimism, however, must be tempered by the possibility that the
resulting Second Amendment analysis may vary depending on local conditions—
for example, the possibility that the government interest side of the analysis,
most notably its interest in crime control, may vary depending on the urban or
rural nature of the jurisdiction in question. See Blocher, supra note 6, at 104
(arguing that local preferences can be accommodated under Second Amendment
doctrine); see also infra note 330 (noting that the fact-finding approach to
Second Amendment enforcement legislation becomes more complex if one
assumes that Second Amendment analysis legitimately accounts for local
differences).
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it, was sharply defined. Seven years before Boerne, in Smith, the
Court had explicitly rejected a broader understanding of that
right—one that found the Free Exercise Clause implicated any
time a government action had the effect of burdening religious
practice. 308 Instead, Smith conceived of the Free Exercise right as
one that arose only when the challenged law targeted religion
specifically. 309 That seemingly sharp definition 310 allowed the
Boerne Court to examine RFRA’s legislative record in order to
determine whether Congress had identified examples of state
violations of the right as thus defined. 311
The Florida Prepaid Court also had the benefit of a relatively
well-defined constitutional right, which allowed it to search the
legislative record for examples. 312 To be sure, the violation
308. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883
(1990) (discussing the Sherbert test).
309. See id. at 872 (“[T]he Clause does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a law . . . if the law is not specifically directed to
religious practice . . . .”).
310. In reality, the matter is significantly more nuanced than this. Scholars
have argued that Smith’s rule, which the Boerne Court described in terms
suggesting that it was a clearly-delineated, core constitutional law rule, was in
fact partially the product of the Smith Court’s anxiety about courts’ ability to
completely apply a broader Free Exercise right requiring courts to weigh the
social importance of a particular regulation against the rights of believers whose
religious conduct might be impacted by that regulation. See McConnell, supra
note 281, at 189–92 (explaining that “the real logic of the Smith decision has to
do with institutional roles”); Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional
Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (1993) (noting the Supreme Court’s view
that the judicial branch is “not equipped to balance religious interests against
governmental concerns”); ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 239–40 (reading
the Smith opinion as both containing a “restrictive reading” of the right at issue
and noting the Supreme Court’s view that the judiciary is ill-equipped to
conduct the required analysis). Whether or not Boerne correctly described Smith
as stating a core constitutional law rule is beyond the scope of this Article.
Rather, this Article assumes that Boerne correctly described Smith, and
assesses what that description means for the usefulness of Boerne’s
fact-finding-based approach to enforcement power questions in other contexts,
such as the Second Amendment.
311. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530–32 (1997) (conducting
an analysis of the “RFRA’s legislative record” and noting no “modern instances
of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry”).
312. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 642–46 (1999) (explaining that the legislative record identifies
instances only of “state patent infringement that do not necessarily violate the
Constitution”).
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targeted by the enforcement legislation at issue in Florida
Prepaid—deprivations of patentees’ property rights without due
process—is not one identifiable with complete clarity. 313 As the
Court has often stated, due process is a flexible concept. 314 Thus,
whether a deprivation of a patent-holder’s right was or was not
accompanied by adequate process is not an obvious
determination. 315 Nevertheless, that determination would at least
be focused on a discrete set of considerations. 316
In contrast to the free exercise and property rights
contexts, 317 in the Second Amendment context, the Court has
both identified a core version of the right, 318 but also strongly
hinted that more penumbral, and thus necessarily hazier,
versions may exist as well. 319 The vaguer nature of those latter
rights makes it harder for a court considering Second
Amendment enforcement legislation to examine Congress’s
factual record to determine whether it reveals violations of “the
constitutional right.” 320 Quite literally, in Second Amendment

313. See id. at 645 (noting that the large variety of products which the
government purchases makes it difficult to discern “the patent status of any
particular invention or device or product” (citing S. REP. NO. 102-280, at 10
(1992))).
314. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (explaining the
well-established principle that “due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands”).
315. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643 (explaining the complexity of
determining when a “State’s infringement of a patent” creates “a deprivation of
property without due process”).
316. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (setting forth a
three-part test for determining when a deprivation of a liberty or property
interest comports with due process).
317. See supra notes 310, 313 (noting the argument that the Free Exercise
right as explicated in Smith was not clearly and sharply delineated and noting
the similarly blurry boundaries of the right to be free of deprivations of property
without due process).
318. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) (discussing
the “core lawful purpose of self-defense”).
319. See id. at 635 (explaining why the case fails to convey a clear
understanding of the Second Amendment right in its entirety).
320. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (providing an
example of a readily identifiable definition of the right at issue allowing a court
to search the legislative record).
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cases going beyond the Heller-identified core, it is not clear what
exactly that “right” is. 321
There is a real irony to this conclusion. Justice Scalia’s
opinion in Heller criticized the dissenters in that case for seeking
to muddy, through what he derided as “interest balancing,” what
he viewed as a clear, unambiguous right. 322 And indeed, if his
analysis is sound (a question on which this Article takes no
position), then the particular right at issue in Heller itself—the
right of law-abiding Americans to possess, for self-defense
purposes in the home, the type of weapon Americans prefer for
that purpose—is a reasonably unambiguous one. 323 But, as lower
courts have discovered when trying to apply Heller to challenges
to other types of gun restrictions, that clarity vanishes once a
plaintiff claims a Second Amendment right that extends beyond
the one vindicated in Heller itself. 324 In turn, the doctrinal tests
courts have employed to evaluate such claims make the gun
possession right look less like the clearly-focused right described
in Heller—and also less like the Free Exercise right (as Boerne

321. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011)
(Wilkinson, J., concurring) (describing the application of the Second Amendment
right as a “terra incognita that courts should only enter upon necessity and only
then by small degree”).
322. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634 (“We know of no other enumerated
constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding
‘interest-balancing’ approach.”).
323. To be sure, ambiguity can creep in at any part of this formula. Is
someone who was adjudicated as a juvenile delinquent, or a jay-walker,
“law-abiding?” See Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 458 (considering a related
question). Is a car the equivalent of a home for a traveling salesman? See id. at
467 (concluding that a car is not a home for the purposes of applying the Second
Amendment). And, of course, what guns have Americans traditionally favored
for self-defense? See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (noting that “handguns are the most
popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home”).
Nevertheless, leaving aside these definitional questions, the core Second
Amendment right as stated by Heller is reasonably clear, certainly as compared
to other rights, such as the abortion right or the right to be free of a government
taking of one’s property. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 846 (1992) (announcing and explaining the “undue” burden standard
governing abortion rights claims); Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104, 123–25 (1978) (setting forth a multi-factor balancing test for
determining when a land-use regulation constitutes a taking of property).
324. See Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 475 (describing the uncertain nature of
applying the Second Amendment right).
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described it) 325 and the due process property right at issue in
Florida Prepaid. 326 Therefore, the muddiness of the underlying
Second Amendment right renders a pure record-based review of
the type performed in Boerne and Florida Prepaid less attractive
as a methodology for performing congruence and proportionality
review. 327
This lack of clarity is not simply a matter of the Court’s
refusal to clarify and expound on the Second Amendment right. 328
Even if the Court were to decide additional Second Amendment
cases, it would need to craft a jurisprudence that recognized and
accounted for the non-core, penumbral, nature of gun possession
rights beyond the one asserted in Heller itself. That
jurisprudence—whether it mirrored lower courts’ adoption of a
multi-stage, methodologically varied inquiry, or simply applied a
vague “intermediate scrutiny” standard—would likely not provide
results that could be easily and predictably transferred to other
gun possession issues. 329 Thus, it seems as though Heller’s
325. See supra note 310 and accompanying text (noting the Boerne Court’s
treatment of the Free Exercise right).
326. See supra notes 312–316 and accompanying text (discussing how the
right to have one’s patent property taken without due process is at least
potentially explainable in clear terms).
327. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530 (providing an example of a case in which
the Supreme Court examined the “RFRA’s legislative record” to assist in
resolving the issues presented).
328. See supra note 191 (citing the cases raising Second Amendment issues
on which the Court has denied certiorari, despite dissenting justices’ arguments
that the Second Amendment right needs more clarification).
329. For example, Eugene Volokh has observed that Heller’s “scope”
analysis—that is, its analysis of whether a particular gun possession right came
within the Second Amendment’s protection at all—is best understood as a
historical inquiry. See Volokh, supra note 3, at 1498 (emphasizing a lack of
“research on the historical scope limitations on the right to bear arms”). As
Professor Volokh points out, that sort of historical methodology means, among
other things, that answers to particular “scope” questions cannot provide
answers by analogy to other scope questions. See id. at 1447 (explaining the
utility of analogies regarding the scope of constitutional rights). For example, an
historical answer to the question of whether minors are completely
disenfranchised from Second Amendment rights says nothing about the
question of whether persons who are barely over the age of majority can be
similarly disenfranchised. See id. (providing an illustrative example of an
analogy regarding minors possessing guns). While the analogy is not precise,
application of intermediate scrutiny to one type of gun restriction—say,
restrictions on possessing guns on a certain type of property—would
nevertheless similarly fail to provide definitive answers to other challenges to
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recognition of non-core Second Amendment rights condemns the
Court—and us—to a jurisprudence that will not provide easy
answers to gun rights questions. 330 In turn, that lack of easy
answers will make it more difficult for Congress to amass a
record of clear constitutional violations justifying enforcement
legislation. 331
V. Arming the Second Amendment: A More Granular Approach
The extant body of congruence and proportionality cases fails
to provide adequate models for reviewing Second Amendment
enforcement legislation. 332 This reality requires that we consider
a final alternative path. This final path abandons reliance on a
bird’s-eye view of Second Amendment doctrine, and instead calls
for more granular consideration of what Congress can add to the
individual analytical steps that doctrine calls for. 333 This
approach holds the promise of rescuing congruence and
gun restrictions because the inputs into the intermediate scrutiny inquiry would
be different.
330. The fact-finding approach to Second Amendment enforcement
legislation is further complicated if one assumes that Second Amendment
analysis legitimately accounts for local differences that might affect aspects of
any interest balancing or tiered scrutiny courts accord to a gun regulation. See
Blocher, supra note 6, at 104–05 (discussing the ability of the Second
Amendment to facilitate varying local preferences). For example, if a court
legitimately gives more weight to a jurisdiction’s crime control justification for
gun control than to another’s because of the first jurisdiction’s higher crime rate,
then query whether a generally-applicable gun rights enforcement law could be
coherently analyzed under the congruence and proportionality standard. Id. In
such a situation, perhaps a reviewing court would be forced to perform
congruence and proportionality review as applied to a particular plaintiff’s
situation, including the jurisdiction in which he wished to exercise the rights
granted by the enforcement legislation. Cf. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518
(2004) (reviewing the congruence and proportionality of the public services
provision of the ADA as applied to claims of courthouse access).
331. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (providing an
example of a readily identifiable definition of the right at issue allowing a court
to search the “RFRA’s legislative record” for violations of the Constitution).
332. See Araiza, Crisis, supra note 182, at 1–2 (describing “enforcement
power scrutiny” as “analytically incoherent”).
333. See Araiza, Deference, supra note 216, at 892 (discussing the more
narrowly focused, or “granular,” questions regarding Congress’s “fact-finding
capabilities and authority”).
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proportionality review from the dead end into which it has
wandered—a dead end illustrated both by the Court’s ad hoc
rejection of the enforcement legislation in Coleman and Shelby
County, 334 as well as by the Second Amendment example this
Article has considered. 335 More generally, it allows Congress a
meaningful role in the project of vindicating Second Amendment
rights while also respecting the Court’s insistence on its own
supremacy in stating constitutional meaning—an insistence
firmly imposed by a broad consensus of the Court in Boerne. 336
This proposed approach follows lower courts’ construction of
Second Amendment doctrine based on the limited guidance Heller
provides. 337 It considers what the character of each step in that
doctrine means for Congress’s ability to contribute to courts’
analysis, based on Congress’s comparative institutional
advantages over courts. 338 Thus, it allows for a congressional role
in vindicating Second Amendment rights to the extent Congress
is institutionally relatively well-suited to contribute to particular
components of courts’ doctrinal analysis. 339
This approach requires a theory about what roles Congress is
in fact comparatively well-suited to play in the project of
vindicating constitutional rights. 340 In other writing I have
developed principles governing the types of congressional
334. See Araiza, Crisis, supra note 182, at 1 (stating that “the Court has
created both analytical confusion and practical dead-ends by focusing on its
enforcement power analysis on judicially created doctrine”).
335. See supra note 321 and accompanying text (explaining the problem that
would arise if the Court applied current approaches to congruence and
proportionality review to Second Amendment enforcement legislation).
336. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508 (noting the power to interpret is the role of
the judiciary).
337. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (providing a
definition of the Second Amendment right as “the right to keep and bear arms”).
338. See Araiza, Crisis, supra note 182, at 1 (discussing Congress’s ability to
find facts).
339. I have elaborated on this process in more detail elsewhere. See Araiza,
Deference, supra note 216, at 882 (explaining that “Congress is institutionally
capable of more careful fact-finding than courts, and its political legitimacy does
militate in favor of deference” (emphasis added)); ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra
note 22, at 235–38 (elaborating on that argument).
340. See ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 235–38 (elaborating on the
rights defined by Congress and how that interacts with the rights defined by the
judiciary).
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determinations that merit particularly great or little judicial
deference. 341 Boiled down, those principles call for very little
deference to congressional findings that shade into legal
conclusions, moderate deference to empirical findings, and very
great deference to findings that reflect value judgments. 342 In
reverse order, these varying levels of deference account for
Congress’s authority to speak for the moral values of the
American people, its fact-finding capabilities (leavened with
proper skepticism about Congress’s incentives to use those
capabilities effectively), and, finally, Boerne’s insistence that
courts enjoy ultimate authority to declare constitutional
meaning. 343
To illustrate this approach, return to the hypothetical
enforcement legislation discussed earlier: a federal law giving
Americans the right to carry loaded guns in their automobiles. 344
As noted earlier, 345 a court considering a direct Second
Amendment challenge to a state law restricting such carriage
could perform as many as five distinct analytical steps. 346 First, it
would determine, using a historical analysis, whether such a
341. See id. at 169–93 (enumerating six principles describing the amount of
deference courts should apply to Congress’s findings of fact in various contexts).
342. By “value judgments” I mean conclusions that reflect moral intuitions
or conclusions, as distinct from objectively verifiable empirics. See Araiza,
Deference, supra note 216, at 897–98 (describing such judgments). Such
findings—for example, that a certain type of discrimination is fundamentally
unfair—reflect neither empirical findings nor legal analysis. Id. While such
findings may be quite relevant to legal issues where such value judgments
influence the ultimate doctrinal answer (for example, in equal protection
issues), they are less relevant in issues such as the scope of some substantive
rights, such as the Second Amendment gun possession right. See Volokh, supra
note 3, at 1447 (explaining the utility of analogies regarding the scope of
constitutional rights). For simplicity, and because value judgments may play a
lesser role in legislation enforcing the Second Amendment, this Article does not
discuss this category.
343. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) (noting the power
of the judicial branch to interpret).
344. See supra notes 234–235 and accompanying text (discussing the
hypothetical and its implications).
345. See supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text (discussing the five
possible steps conducted in an analysis of the application of the Second
Amendment).
346. See supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text (reciting the five steps
in detail).
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right fell within the scope of the Second Amendment at all. 347
Assuming a positive answer to that question, the next step would
be to determine whether that restriction imposed a substantial
burden on the right. 348 Assuming that the regulation did
constitute such a burden, the third step would require a court to
determine the proximity of that right from the core right
identified in Heller. 349 Based on that proximity, the fourth step
would require the court to select a particular standard of review,
while the fifth and final step would entail application of that
review. 350
Consider the different characters of these inquiries, and
Congress’s relative institutional capacity to contribute to their
resolution. 351 The first question—whether the right in question
falls within the scope of the Second Amendment—is one that
lower courts have generally tried to answer based on a
historical/originalist analysis. 352 There is no particular reason to
believe that Congress is any better than courts at performing that
analysis. Perhaps more importantly, to the extent such analysis
purports to uncover the actual meaning of the constitutional
347. See supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text (discussing the cases
where a historical analysis was applied to determine whether the right at issue
is covered by the Second Amendment).
348. See supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text (noting the cases
where the question involved whether the government action imposed a
substantial burden on the right at issue).
349. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (discussing
the core aspect of the right).
350. See supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text (discussing the cases
applying the concluding steps in the analysis).
351. As will become clear, any fact-findings or other non-legal conclusions
that might be relevant to these doctrinal inquiries are empirical in nature. See
ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 234–35 (noting the relative inapplicability
of value judgments to Second Amendment enforcement legislation). For this
reason, this Article does not further discuss the value-judgement findings
identified earlier in the text. See supra note 342 and accompanying text
(explaining the definition of value judgement). But see infra note 419
(recognizing that other substantive rights may be susceptible to congressional
enforcement via legislation reflecting such value judgments).
352. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (observing that a “historical
analysis” is utilized by several courts); see also United States v. Chovan, 735
F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that a federal law prohibiting
“domestic violence misdemeanants” from possessing weapons implicated rights
protected by the Second Amendment, given the lack of a historical foundation
for disarming such persons).
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provision in question—here, the actual scope of the Second
Amendment as understood by the framing generation—allowing
Congress a role in answering such questions cedes to Congress
some degree of authority in determining core constitutional
meaning, in contravention of Boerne. 353 Indeed, Justice Scalia’s
insistence that originalist methodology reflects a vision of law as
“the business of the courts” 354 necessarily implies that Congress
has little authority to contribute to determinations reached via
that methodology—at least no more than other individuals or
institutions who might be able to offer persuasive argumentation
on the point. 355
More generally, and beyond the implications of adopting an
originalist methodology, one might worry about allowing
Congress a role in determining the scope of a given constitutional
right. 356 Our instincts might label such questions inherently
legal—and, at least under one understanding of the separation of
powers, therefore inherently judicial. 357 Boerne embraced this
353. In this context, “core” does not refer to the Second Amendment’s
Heller-identified home self-defense “core,” but, instead, refers more generally to
actual constitutional meaning, rather than any construction derived from
decisional heuristics such as tiered scrutiny review. In this sense, the notion of
“core” constitutional meaning is closely related to Dean Sager’s identification of
rights through a process of “analytical” reasoning, as opposed to reasoning
derived from courts’ concerns about their institutional competence to state and
enforce the full extent of a particular right. See supra notes 223–227 and
accompanying text (noting the distinction between analytical reasoning and
institutional competence reasoning in practice).
354. See Scalia, supra note 11, at 854 (referencing the “business of the
courts”).
355. Cf. Araiza, Deference, supra note 216, at 887–93 (discussing the proper
weight courts should accord congressional findings based on their
persuasiveness as opposed to Congress’s authority to make such findings).
356. To be sure, scholars disagree about whether such a congressional role
violates the separation of powers or, alternatively, whether Congress enjoys at
least some degree of authority to interpret the Constitution, subject perhaps to
only deferential review by courts. Compare David Cole, The Value of Seeing
Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill
of Rights, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 59–71 (arguing in favor of such congressional
authority), with id. at 63 n.93 (citing scholars who take the opposing position).
357. Cf. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1449 (describing the “scope” inquiry as one
seeking to determine whether “the restriction is outside the terms of the right as
set forth by the constitution” and suggesting that its answer is found by
recourse to “the constitutional text, the original meaning, or our understanding
of background constitutional norms”).
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latter, judicial-supremacist, understanding. 358 Given that this
Article seeks to find a viable approach to applying Boerne’s
standard, it takes that understanding as a background
assumption. Consider, then, this instinct. As a rough analogy, one
would probably not intuitively accept that Congress could enact
legislation enforcing the First Amendment’s Speech Clause by
determining, contra current doctrine, that as a historical matter
obscene speech fell within the “scope” of the First Amendment’s
free speech guarantee. 359 One would think, then, that Congress
should have little influence over this first stage of doctrinal
analysis.
The second inquiry courts often perform in Second
Amendment cases considers whether a particular gun regulation
imposes a substantial burden on the asserted right. 360 While one
might consider this primarily an empirical inquiry, on the theory
that the substantiality of a burden can only be judged based on
the facts, 361 a moment’s reflection suggests that the matter is not
that straightforward. The substantiality of a burden can also be
understood as a legal standard. 362 Lower courts applying this
requirement in Second Amendment cases have implicitly
recognized the law-intensive nature of this inquiry by analogizing
to other constitutional rights doctrines when deciding what
358. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) (explaining that
the Supreme Court “has had primary authority to interpret” the Constitution).
359. See Cole, supra note 356, at 54–55 (making a similar suggestion);
Ezell I, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011) (drawing a similar comparison when
considering how to apply the “scope” step of Second Amendment analysis).
360. See, e.g., United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 2012)
(“Rather, heightened scrutiny is triggered only by those restrictions
that . . . operate as a substantial burden on the ability of law-abiding citizens to
possess and use a firearm for self defense . . . .”); Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776,
786 (9th Cir. 2011) (inquiring into the substantiality of the burden imposed by a
challenged gun regulation).
361. Cf. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1458 (arguing that a particular sub-part of
the substantiality inquiry requires “an inquiry into the functional magnitude of
the restriction” on the constitutional right); id. at 1460 (“Estimating the burden
[a particular gun restriction places] on self-defense will require considering how
a particular hypothetical defense scenario is likely to play out under different
regulatory schemes . . . .”).
362. See, e.g., Decastro, 682 F.3d at 167–68 (analogizing the “substantial
burden” inquiry in Second Amendment cases to those in abortion, takings, and
right to marry cases); see also Volokh, supra note 3, at 1454–55 (noting
analogous inquiries in other constitutional rights areas).
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constitutes a “substantial burden.” 363 Indeed, when one
remembers that the linchpin of the right to abortion is whether
the challenged abortion restriction imposes a “substantial
obstacle,” 364 one realizes the potentially outcome determinative
nature of a congressional conclusion about substantiality. 365
Given its potential significance, a conclusive determination by
Congress that a given gun regulation constitutes a substantial
impairment could conceivably amount to a statement of
constitutional meaning, with serious implications for Boerne’s
insistence that courts maintain the ultimate authority over such
statements. 366
To be sure, this is not to suggest that federal enforcement
legislation has nothing to say about the substantiality question,
or that a court would be justified in ignoring congressional
findings that speak to the substantiality of the burden imposed
by a particular gun regulation. 367 It’s obviously true that even the
363. See Decastro, 682 F.3d at 167–68 (referring to the “substantial burden”
in the constitutional areas of abortions, takings, and the right to marry); see also
Volokh, supra note 3, at 1454–55 (discussing the “substantial burden” inquiry in
different constitutional doctrine cases).
364. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992)
(“An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its
purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”).
365. See id. (explaining that a “substantial obstacle” prohibition “protect[s]
the central right recognized by Roe while at the same time accommodating the
State’s profound interest in potential life”).
366. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) (explaining that
the exercise of “the interpretive power” is the judicial branch’s responsibility).
367. Indeed, it may be that the conclusions about the substantiality of the
burden are different in the abortion and gun rights contexts. In particular, a
conclusion that a law places a “substantial obstacle” in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion is an ultimate legal conclusion about the constitutionality of
such a law, while a conclusion that a gun restriction “substantially burdens” a
Second Amendment-protected right merely allows the plaintiff’s challenge to
advance to the next stage of analysis. Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (“A
finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”), with, e.g., Heller v.
District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (concluding that a
finding that a restriction constitutes a substantial burden on the core Second
Amendment right triggers a heavier burden of persuasion on the government at
the subsequent stages of analysis). Thus, one might argue that a gun rights
enforcement statute denominating a particular type of a regulation as a
“substantial burden” on Second Amendment rights does not threaten the Court’s
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most inherently legal issues embed significant factual or
empirical components. To the extent that findings from Congress
help create the empirical context for the court’s ultimate
judgment on the substantiality question, those findings merit
some degree of judicial respect. By the same token, however, to
the extent such findings conclusively answer the substantial
burden question, judicial control over constitutional meaning
requires that such deference cannot be absolute.
The third inquiry requires courts to determine how far the
right at issue lies from the Heller-identified core of the Second
Amendment. 368 Making this proximity determination constitutes
a delicate business. How is one to determine “how far” a
authoritative role in stating constitutional meaning to the same degree as a
federal law denominating a particular type of abortion restriction as a
“substantial obstacle.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. See also Araiza, Deference, supra
note 216, at 910–13 (counseling very little judicial deference to congressional
fact-findings that essentially state legal conclusions). Nevertheless, a
congressional finding on the question of whether a particular gun restriction
constitutes a “substantial burden” on Second Amendment rights does have
significant legal impact: an affirmative finding on that question allows the
Second Amendment analysis to continue, while a negative finding on that
question stops the analysis. See, e.g., ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 912
(explaining the implications of congressional fact-findings in a related context).
368. See, e.g., Ezell I, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011) (stating that “laws
restricting activity lying closer to the margins of the Second Amendment
right . . . may be more easily justified” than those that impose “a severe burden
on the core Second Amendment right”); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127,
1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (following Ezell I’s approach). While at first glance this
inquiry might seem quite similar to the question of the substantiality of the
burden, courts have distinguished the two. Id. For example, in Chovan, the
Ninth Circuit recognized that a federal law prohibiting domestic violence
misdemeanants from possessing guns did not implicate the core Second
Amendment right of law-abiding citizens to possess guns for home self-defense.
See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138 (stating that the Second Amendment right in
Heller does not apply to non-law-abiding citizens). Nevertheless, it
acknowledged that the law’s permanent prohibition on gun possession
constituted a substantial burden on the relevant Second Amendment right—
recognizing that that right lay at some distance from the core right the
Amendment recognizes. See id. at 1138 (stating that the regulation in question
“does not implicate the core Second Amendment right, but it does place a
substantial burden on the right”). Together, these second and third inquiries
establish the seriousness of the infringement on the right: the second considers
the weight (or “substantiality”) of the infringement, while the third considers
the constitutional centrality of the right suffering the infringement. See
generally supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text (discussing the five
possible steps conducted in an analysis of Second Amendment application).
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particular gun right lies from the Heller-identified core? 369 This is
a highly conceptual question, given the inability to express
concretely the distance between a penumbral and a core right.
Certainly, it is not a question that can be described as
unambiguously empirical. Indeed, the entire idea of
denominating rights as “core” and “peripheral” (and thus the
process of measuring the distance between such rights) seems to
be a legal enterprise, analogous in character to the identification
of something as a right to begin with. 370 To the extent congruence
and proportionality review requires that the ultimate power to
state constitutional meaning remains lodged with courts, the
ultimate proximity determination, just like the ultimate
determination about the existence of a right, must remain with
courts. 371
Nevertheless, Heller introduces notes of ambiguity into this
analysis. 372 That ambiguity again highlights our earlier insight
that even legal questions trigger factual inquiries that are
susceptible to meaningful congressional input. 373 Recall Justice
Scalia’s statement, when explaining his description of the core
Second Amendment right, that self-defense needs are “most
acute” in the home. 374 To the extent he was providing an
explanation for why the Second Amendment right was originally
thought to be most pressing in the home, that statement simply
provides an explanatory backdrop for his discovery, through legal
(originalist) analysis, of a particular right. 375 By contrast, if the
369. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) (holding
that the “core lawful purpose” of firearm possession is “self-defense”).
370. Compare, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 529
(2009) (“[R]eferences to excretory and sexual material surely lie at the periphery
of First Amendment concern.” (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
743 (1978))), with Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (“[S]peech on
public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values . . . .” (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983))).
371. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508 (noting the interpretive role of the courts).
372. See infra notes 373–376 and accompanying text (explaining the
ambiguity).
373. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s
“fact-finding capabilities and authority”).
374. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (describing the home as “the place where the
importance of the lawful defense of self, family, and property is most acute”).
375. Id.
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right itself is a more general right of self-defense, with Justice
Scalia explaining that that right is “most acute” in the home
because empirically that’s where the right is most important,
then, as with our automobile carriage example, Congress might
have a role in delineating its scope—for example, by finding that
automobile travel exposes Americans to an unusually high risk of
crime. 376
The difference between these characterizations tracks the
difference, explained above, 377 between legal conclusions and
findings of fact (including broad social facts), and the different
levels of deference appropriate for these distinct types of
congressional conclusions. 378 As suggested by our analysis of
Second Amendment doctrinal steps so far, Congress should enjoy
a more robust role in vindicating rights—including Second
Amendment rights—when it finds such facts, rather than when it
offers legal conclusions that more directly influence the contour of
the underlying right. 379
The distinction between the leeway Congress enjoys when it
finds empirical facts bearing on the importance of the right at
issue, and when instead Congress simply decrees that a certain
right exists or is of a particular importance, becomes even
sharper when one moves to the fourth and fifth inquiries:
respectively, the identification and then application of the
appropriate scrutiny standard. 380 Both of these determinations

376. See Araiza, Deference, supra note 216, at 905–26 (explaining the
distinction between congressional findings of empirical fact and findings that
constitute legal conclusions).
377. See supra note 342 and accompanying text (explaining and defining
value judgements).
378. Cf. Post, supra note 13, at 80 (noting that the Court’s characterization
of libraries in [United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 235–36
(2003)] was integral to the justices’ conflicting conclusions about the First
Amendment claim in that case, but that such characterizations require an
understanding of society’s view of libraries and their appropriate role in society).
379. This tentative lesson requires the caveat that a doctrinal focus on local
facts may necessarily limit the relevance of more generally-applicable facts
supporting enforcement legislation. See Blocher, supra note 6, at 135–36
(discussing the ability of the Second Amendment to facilitate varying local
preferences).
380. See supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text (discussing the
possible steps involved in an analysis of Second Amendment applications).
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involve evaluating facts against a legal standard. 381 The
identification of the appropriate standard of review requires a
judge to determine what the results of the second and third steps
noted above (respectively, the substantiality of the burden and
the proximity of the impacted gun right to Heller’s core) 382 mean
for how stringently the gun restriction should be reviewed. 383
Similarly, application of that standard requires the judge to
evaluate the importance of the asserted government interest, and
how well-tailored the challenged law is to vindicating that
interest. 384
At first blush, the nature of these final two determinations
suggests Congress’s comparatively smaller role in influencing
them via enforcement legislation. 385 If the Court insists (as it has
since Boerne) that it enjoys ultimate supremacy over the meaning
of the Constitution, then it must have the final say over
evaluative judgments of the sort made in these final two
analytical steps. 386 Those judgments—for example, that strict
scrutiny is called for in a particular gun rights case, or that a
given gun restriction is sufficiently narrowly tailored to
withstand such scrutiny—are fundamentally legal in character,
even if they require an understanding of the background empirics
of a given issue. 387

381. See supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text (discussing the
possible steps involved in an analysis of Second Amendment applications).
382. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (noting the
lower court’s Second Amendment analysis involving two steps).
383. See supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text (describing the five
potential steps conducted in a Second Amendment analysis).
384. See Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 181–82 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding that
strict scrutiny is the applicable standard of review for the Second Amendment
claim at issue).
385. See supra notes 203–214 and accompanying text (providing
explanations of the five possible analytical steps for applications of the Second
Amendment and the role of courts in each step).
386. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) (noting that the
power to interpret is the role of the judiciary).
387. See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989)
(refusing to defer to an asserted congressional finding that a particular
content-based speech restriction was the only effective way of protecting minors,
on the ground that “while we do not ignore [that finding], it is our task in the
end to decide whether Congress has violated the Constitution”).
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At the very least, as a practical matter such judgments often
come close to dictating the result in a given case. For example, a
determination that a given gun restriction triggers strict scrutiny
makes it quite likely that the restriction will be struck down, a
reality reflected by the expression “strict in theory, fatal in
fact.” 388 Conversely, a determination that a given restriction is
narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest all-but
decides an individual rights case in favor of the government. 389 If
Congress enjoyed a large role in making those determinations, it
would essentially be dictating the results of constitutional
cases. 390 Indeed, on one reading such congressional declarations
would dictate not just results, but the outcome of a reasoning
process that is understood to be the particular province of
courts. 391 Whatever the merits of an argument that Congress
should enjoy that power, or should at least enjoy significant
deference when it makes such determinations, 392 this result is
impossible—or at least quite difficult—to square with Boerne. 393
388. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term—Foreward: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
389. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 129 (providing an example of a case where the
Court suggested that deferring to a congressional judgment about the outcome
of strict scrutiny review would effectively allow Congress to determine whether
its own law violated the Constitution).
390. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508 (explaining that the interpretive function,
specifically of the Constitution, is the role of the judicial branch).
391. See, e.g., Post, supra note 13, at 58 (“Whether a classification serves a
‘compelling’ governmental interest or is ‘narrowly tailored’ are questions that
must be answered primarily by reference to the legal precedents of the Court.”).
392. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 356 (arguing for such deference).
393. To be sure, if one reads Boerne narrowly, as responding to a statute
(RFRA) that was unusually threatening to the judicial power, then one could
conceivably find room for a larger, legitimate congressional role in making the
judgments discussed in the text. For example, one could read RFRA’s explicit
approval of the pre-Smith doctrinal rule governing free religious exercise as an
explicit challenge to the Court’s power to determine the meaning of
constitutional rights. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-141, §§ 2–3, 5–6, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb (2012)) (highlighting Congress’s RFRA finding that the doctrinal test
set forth in pre-Smith case law constituted “a workable test for striking sensible
balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental
interests”), invalidated by Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507. On this theory, an
enforcement statute that “merely” concluded that a given test (say, strict
scrutiny) was satisfied might be understood as posing less serious of a challenge
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But ambiguity creeps into these final steps as well. It is
impossible to ignore the reality that these final two doctrinal
determinations above involve distinct sub-inquiries. Some of
those inquiries, to the extent they’re more heavily empirical
rather than reflective of pure legal analysis, may merit relatively
greater judicial receptiveness to congressional input. 394 To return
again to our hypothetical enforcement statute, a congressional
determination that gun possession in automobiles is the only
practical way for Americans to defend themselves against a
serious threat to their safety would be difficult for a court to
reject, given the respect due Congress’s empirical judgments. 395
Of course, courts—and in particular the Supreme Court—have
shown themselves willing to privilege their own view of the
world, even as against competing visions from Congress and state
legislatures. 396 But to say that such self-confidence (if not
arrogance) exists in the judiciary is not to say that it is wise or
desirable. A more humble judicial response to Congress’s
fact-finding capability might acknowledge respect for both
Congress’s capacity for empirical investigation and, when
relevant to enforcement power analysis, its authority to speak for
the values of the American people. 397 The deference that would
to the Court’s law-declaring power. An even less serious challenge might be
detected in a statute that merely decided that a particular doctrinal test (say,
strict scrutiny) was warranted given the facts relevant to a particular gun
possession context. Nevertheless, even these latter two types of enforcement
statutes would effectively dictate the outcome of constitutional cases, and as
such, would likely encounter a serious argument that they conflicted with at
least the spirit of Boerne.
394. See Araiza, Deference, supra note 216, at 906–26 (setting forth
principles for deference determinations that depend in part on the type of fact
for which deference is claimed).
395. Id.
396. See generally Jennifer Mason McAward, Supreme Court—October Term
2012—Foreword: The Confident Court, 47 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 379 (2014). The
reference in the text to state legislatures should again serve as a reminder that
local regulatory responses to local conditions may justify their own deference,
which might in turn limit the respect appropriately accorded congressional
findings about national conditions more generally. See Blocher, supra note 6, at
134 (discussing local preferences in relation to Second Amendment
applications); supra note 330 (discussing same). The prospect of such
jurisdiction-specific deference only increases the complexity of the deference
calculus in the Second Amendment enforcement context.
397. See Araiza, Deference, supra note 216, at 882 (arguing that
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flow from such an acknowledgement could give Congress a
meaningful role even in these last two steps of Second
Amendment analysis. 398
In sum, this more granular approach to the enforcement
power in Second Amendment cases calls for recognizing the
distinct analytical steps that make up Second Amendment
analysis, the extent to which each of those steps includes
inquiries that are particularly susceptible to meaningful
congressional input, and the nature of that input. 399 Thus, it
combines the approach taken by some post-Boerne cases, which
keyed judicial review of enforcement legislation to the judicial
doctrine governing the underlying right, with the approach taken
in Florida Prepaid and Boerne itself, which considered the extent
to which Congress had found facts relevant to the underlying
right. 400
Both of these approaches contain kernels of truth. The first
approach, most clearly exemplified by Lane and the
Kimel/Garrett/Hibbs trilogy, reflects the post-Boerne reality that
enforcement legislation must hew relatively closely to the Court’s
own statement of underlying constitutional law. 401 The second
approach recognizes that Congress may find facts that are
particularly relevant to a conclusion that states are in fact
violating the underlying constitutional rule. 402 But both of these
approaches also suffer from flaws. The approach tying
enforcement legislation to constitutional doctrine ignores the
important role Congress can play in vindicating the
congressional findings that reflect value judgments should enjoy significant
judicial deference); ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 234–35 (noting that
value judgments may play a lesser role in legislation enforcing some substantive
rights).
398. See Araiza, Deference, supra note 216, at 882 (discussing the benefits of
judicial deference that preserves “meaningful” congressional participation).
399. See Araiza, Deference, supra note 216, at 892 (explaining the
appropriate analysis of Congress’s “fact-finding capabilities”).
400. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527 (1997) (providing an
example of a case where the court was able to utilize facts found by Congress to
determine if constitutional rights were invaded).
401. See supra notes 141–153 and accompanying text (discussing Lane and
the Kimel/Garrett/Hibbs trilogy).
402. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531 (noting a “lack of support in the legislative
record” to show findings that the constitutional right in question had been
violated).
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court-announced rule—a role that can become especially
prominent when the relevant analysis turns on conclusions or
findings Congress is best-suited to reach. 403 Relatedly, it also
ignores the reality that many constitutional rights doctrines are
best described as a set of judicial heuristics or decision rules that
reflect institutional competence concerns, rather than statements
of core constitutional meaning. 404 For its part, the fact-finding
based approach to congruence and proportionality, as important
as it is, is inadequate without a doctrinal anchor setting the
boundaries for judicial judgments about the relevance and
weightiness of Congress’s findings. 405 Coleman and Shelby
County demonstrate how, without such an anchor, enforcement
power review degenerates into an ad hoc critique of Congress’s
handiwork. 406 This Article’s proposed approach combines these
two approaches, and in doing so takes the best from each while
avoiding each one’s distinctive shortcomings. 407
VI. Conclusion: Enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment
The analysis so far has focused on congressional power to
enforce the Second Amendment. But the insights gained up to
now allow us to broaden our focus and consider the lessons this
analysis provides for Congress’s enforcement power more
generally. This broader inquiry is timely. The Court’s current
403. See ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 169–93 (describing the
deference which courts should give to various types of congressionally found
facts).
404. See supra notes 223–227 and accompanying text (connecting this idea
with Dean Sager’s distinction between “analytical” and “institutional”
foundations for particular judicial statements and enforcement of rights).
405. See Araiza, Crisis, supra note 182, at 3–4 (noting that “the Court
apparently feels no hesitation in second-guessing quintessentially legislative
judgements about the factual foundations or policy need for enforcement
legislation” and that currently “no objective guideposts guide the Court’s review
of such matters”).
406. See id. at 3 (noting that “[a]fter Coleman and Shelby County,” courts
essentially have unlimited discretion regarding “how much deference to accord
congressional judgements supporting the factual and policy bases for particular
enforcement legislation”).
407. See supra notes 403–406 and accompanying text (discussing the
problems associated with these two approaches to enforcement legislation).
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approach to congruence and proportionality has reached a
conceptual dead end. 408 As Part II explained, after a period in
which the nature of the enforcement power challenges reaching
the Court allowed it to use decisional heuristics to guide its
analysis, 409 more recent enforcement power cases have left the
Court adrift. 410 In particular, the Court in Coleman and Shelby
County essentially reweighed in an ad hoc manner the factual
and policy judgments Congress made when enacting,
respectively, the FMLA and the Voting Rights Act. 411 Such ad hoc
analysis leaves the Court vulnerable to the charge that it is
simply disagreeing with those judgments, under the guise of
finding enforcement legislation to fail the Enforcement Clause’s
“appropriateness” 412 requirement. 413 The Enforcement Clause
demands a better approach.
A. A More Granular Enforcement Clause Jurisprudence
The more granular analysis called for in Part V reflects such
an alternative. 414 Under this approach, the Court would apply
408. See Araiza, Crisis, supra note 182, at 1 (explaining that the “Court has
created both analytical confusion and practical dead-ends by focusing its
enforcement power analysis on judicially created doctrine, rather than core
constitutional meaning”).
409. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing Kimel, Garrett,
and Hibbs).
410. See Araiza, Crisis, supra note 182, at 3–4 (noting a lack of “objective
guideposts to guide the Court’s review of such matters”).
411. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (providing a detailed
overview of the analyses conducted in Coleman and Shelby County).
412. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” (emphasis
added)); see also id. amend. XV, § 2 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation.” (emphasis added)).
413. This critique is not limited to those favoring a broader enforcement
power. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 554, 557–58 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (explaining, in similar terms, the reasons Justice Scalia was
repudiating the congruence and proportionality test in favor of a more
restrictive approach).
414. See supra Part V (rejecting a broad understanding of Second
Amendment jurisprudence and advocating a more granular consideration of
what Congress can add to the analytical framework of Second Amendment
doctrine).
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congruence and proportionality review only after carefully
considering how Congress’s unique institutional capacities allow
it to contribute insights to the questions judicial doctrine poses
for evaluating the particular constitutional right at issue. 415 This
approach respects Boerne’s insistence on judicial supremacy in
stating constitutional meaning. 416 In particular, courts remain
responsible for stating the judicial doctrine that poses the
questions to which Congress can contribute insights in the search
for answers. 417 At the other end of the process, courts also retain
the ultimate authority to determine whether Congress’s insights
do in fact justify a particular answer to the given enforcement
power question. 418 But in the middle, Congress’s capacities—in
particular, its capacities both to find empirical facts and to
express the values of the American people 419—give it a
meaningful role, if not in stating constitutional meaning, then in
vindicating it through legislation imposing concrete rules of
conduct on state governments and other actors. The analysis in
Part V exemplifies how courts could effectuate that congressional
role. 420

415. See supra Part V (arguing that congressional findings can help to create
an empirical context for the court’s ultimate judgment and are, thus, due a
degree of judicial respect).
416. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) (stating the
Court’s acknowledgment of its supreme authority to resolve cases and
controversies).
417. This approach avoids the enforcement power review becoming an ad
hoc critique of congressional action as occurred in Coleman and Shelby County.
See generally Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30 (2012); Shelby
Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
418. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524–27 (presenting the Court’s history of ruling
on Congress’s use of the enforcement power in Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence).
419. The fact that some substantive rights areas may not be susceptible to
enforcement legislation grounded in Congress’s claims to be instantiating
Americans’ value judgments, see supra note 351 and accompanying text, does
not mean that such judgments are irrelevant to all enforcement legislation
enforcing substantive rights. See ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 236
(suggesting one substantive rights area where value judgments may in fact
support enforcement legislation).
420. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524–27 (explaining that the Enforcement
Clause limits Congress to a remedial role rather than a role in defining
Fourteenth Amendment rights).
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Can this new congressional role be squared with the concept
of congruence and proportionality review? At one level, that
formula presents itself, literally, as a classic proportionality test.
So understood, one can perhaps understand why the Court in the
Kimel/Garrett/Hibbs trilogy, and even in Lane, relied so heavily
on the degree to which the challenged enforcement legislation
tracked the importance or centrality of the underlying
constitutional right that legislation sought to enforce. 421 The
more granular approach this Article proposes requires a more
nuanced understanding of the concepts of “congruence” and
“proportionality.” 422 As it has made clear, the proposed approach
to congruence and proportionality requires a far more intricate
analysis than the application of a simple thumb on the scale
favoring or disfavoring enforcement legislation based on the
importance or centrality of the underlying right Congress seeks to
enforce, 423 or even a simple comparison of the rules of conduct
laid down by the Constitution and the enforcement statute in
question. 424 Rather, this understanding would require courts to
think about “congruence” and “proportionality” in a more holistic
way, by considering the degree to which enforcement legislation,
and especially the congressional findings underlying it, help
answer the questions posed by courts’ constitutional doctrine. 425
421. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 532–33 (2004) (noting how
analogous the Americans with Disabilities Act’s “reasonable accommodation”
requirement was to the underlying constitutional law rule); Nev. Dep’t of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (“The FMLA aims to protect the
right to be free from gender-based discrimination in the workplace.”); Bd. of Trs.
of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) (beginning its inquiry
with the limitations placed upon the states in their treatment of the disabled by
§ 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
422. See supra Part V (treating congruence and proportionality review as
embedding fact and policy inquiries).
423. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 356 (engaging in a skeptical review of
legislation enforcing the equal protection rights of disabled persons); Hibbs, 538
U.S. at 721 (engaging in a more relaxed review of legislation enforcing the equal
protection rights of women).
424. See supra Part IV (referencing how Lane plotted the Americans with
Disabilities Act’s “reasonable accommodation” requirement against the
underlying constitutional rule).
425. See supra Part V (suggesting a fix for the wrong-turn in congruence and
proportionality review that has led to arguably ad hoc review of enforcement
legislation).
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Under this approach, an enforcement statute would be
congruent and proportional if it enacted a substantive rule of
conduct reflecting the relevant core constitutional law, as
supported by appropriate congressional determinations. 426 For
example, the employment provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act—the provisions struck down in Garrett—would
have been upheld to the extent Congress had demonstrated that
employment discrimination against the disabled was largely
marked by either irrationality or animus, the core rules
governing the equal protection guarantee. 427 Similarly, the
self-care leave provision of the FMLA—the provision struck down
in Coleman—would have been upheld if Congress had
demonstrated that that provision targeted the same phenomenon
that persuaded the Court to uphold the FMLA’s family-care leave
provision, namely, employers’ perceptions about women’s relative
undesirability as employees given their presumed domestic
responsibilities. 428 Note that the defenders of the self-care leave
provision did in fact make this argument in Coleman; however,
the plurality rejected it as “overly complicated” and
“unconvincing.” 429 Under this Article’s approach, congressional
426. See supra Part V (applying this approach to the hypothetical law giving
Americans the right to carry loaded firearms in their cars).
427. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, Reasoning About the Irrational: The
Roberts Court and the Future of Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 217, 275
(2011)
The baseline of the American constitutional order is a government
that acts rationally, but not merely in the sense that it has reasons
for what it does; rationality in traditional thought has also meant
that government’s actions are undertaken in good faith and for
reasons that are generally seen to be appropriate.
428. Of course, the personal-care provision targeted that phenomenon
indirectly, by providing personal-care leave in order to neutralize the effect of
the assumption that women would be the primary users of FMLA family-care
leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2012). As noted earlier in the discussion of Coleman, see
supra notes 156–170 and accompanying text, defenders of the personal-care
provision noted that Congress concluded that employers perceived family-care
leave as a woman’s benefit that rendered women less desirable as employees.
Thus, the argument made by the plaintiffs was that the provision of family-care
leave encouraged additional sex discrimination that would be mitigated by the
provision of personal-care leave. See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566
U.S. 30, 39 (2012) (discussing the mitigating inclusion of personal-care leave).
Nevertheless, the phenomenon itself is similar, with the only difference being
the directness with which the statute targeted the constitutional wrong.
429. See Coleman, 566 U.S. at 40 (“Petitioner’s overly complicated argument
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findings about social reality 430—here, employer perceptions and
likely reactions to the provision of family-care leave—should have
enjoyed a level of deference the Coleman plurality did not
accord. 431
Other congressional determinations might merit less weight
in the enforcement power calculus. For example, as this Article
has argued throughout, judicial decisions that have the status of
statements of core constitutional meaning are not appropriately
subject to supplementation by Congress. 432 To take a Second
Amendment example, an enforcement statute that declared that
the core of the Second Amendment includes the right of public
carriage of a firearm would contradict Heller’s identification of
the home as the locus for the core Second Amendment right. 433 Of
course, Heller did not rule out Second Amendment protection for
gun possession outside the home. 434 As this Article has also
suggested, Congress could play a valid and useful role in enacting
enforcement legislation that applies the relevant judicial doctrine
to facts that Congress is particularly well-suited to find,
especially when that doctrine extends beyond its core
application. 435 But statements of core constitutional meaning—
what Dean Sager identifies as “analytically-[derived]”
about how the self-care provision works in tandem with the family-care
provision is unconvincing and in the end does not comply with the clear
requirements of City of Boerne.”).
430. See ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 169–93 (acknowledging
Congress’s unique understanding of social reality and arguing that courts ought
to defer to congressional determinations based on such understanding).
431. See Coleman, 566 U.S. at 40 (“Petitioner’s overly complicated argument
about how the self-care provision works in tandem with the family-care
provisions is unconvincing and in the end does not comply with the clear
requirements of City of Boerne.”).
432. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) (“The power to
interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary.”).
433. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (“The
prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where the need for defense of self,
family, and property is most acute.”).
434. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 2011)
(stating that Heller’s designation of the home as the place where the need for
defense is most acute “suggest[s] that some form of the right applies where that
need is not ‘most acute’”).
435. See supra Part V (labeling Congress’s fact-finding ability a unique
institutional capability).
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constitutional
interpretations—remain
immune
from
436
congressional countermanding via enforcement legislation.
These quick examples illustrate the complexity of the
approach this Article suggests. It requires the Court to
distinguish between its statements of core constitutional meaning
and mere decisional heuristics such as equal protection tiered
scrutiny analysis. 437 It thus requires the Court to understand
which congressional determinations shade over into conclusions
about the content of constitutional law, which Boerne insists
remain the ultimate province of the judiciary. 438 But at the same
time this approach obliges the court to be sensitive to the types of
determinations Congress is best-suited to make, and how those
determinations help answer the questions the Court’s doctrine
demands be answered. 439
B. Challenges
These inquiries are sensitive and difficult. But this more
nuanced understanding of congruence and proportionality, even if
difficult and challenging to apply, is necessary.
1. The Challenge of Variety
It is necessary, first, because of the great diversity of
doctrinal tests governing substantive rights protected by the Due
Process Clause. In a world in which the subject-matter of
enforcement legislation migrates beyond equal protection group
rights and toward the substantive rights protected by the Due
436. See Sager, supra note 223, at 1241 (“[I]t is appropriate for the Supreme
Court to overturn a congressional enactment under [§] 5 if it finds that the
enactment cannot be justified by any analytically defensible conception of the
relevant constitutional concept.”).
437. See ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 22, at 50–83 (explaining tiered
scrutiny).
438. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524 (stating the supreme authority of the
judiciary to sit and decide cases and controversies as delegated in Article III of
the United States Constitution).
439. See supra Part V (discussing the benefits of Congress’s institutional
capacities and advocating for the courts’ utilization of these capacities of
Congress in judicial analysis).
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Process Clause, 440 a simple proportionality inquiry, guided by a
straightforward decisional heuristic such as tiered scrutiny, is
inadequate to the task. 441 Substantive constitutional rights
doctrine is strikingly diverse. Every Bill of Rights provision that
has been incorporated (and that therefore is susceptible to
congressional enforcement) brings with it its own doctrinal
structure. 442 Sometimes those doctrines will share elements, 443
while some inquiries will be sui generis to that particular right. 444
That variety necessarily renders congruence and proportionality
review similarly variegated—at least if that review aspires to be
a credible evaluation of enforcement legislation that both respects
Congress’s admittedly broad authority to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment but also recognizes the Court’s insistence on its
ultimate authority to state constitutional meaning.
2. The Challenge of Complexity
Even within the realm of any given constitutional right, the
internal complexity of many constitutional rights doctrines poses
a serious challenge to congruence and proportionality review. The
Second Amendment example this Article has explored reveals
how intricate any given doctrine may be. 445 There is no reason to
believe that the Second Amendment is unique. For example, free
speech doctrine is remarkably complex, and has only grown more
440. For example, in addition to gun rights, it is possible to envision
enforcement legislation that targets controversial local police practices and local
and state takings of property.
441. See Winkler, supra note 27, at 228–32 (noting and describing the
various doctrinal tests courts apply to different Bill of Rights provisions).
442. See id. (stating the applicable test for each amendment of the Bill of
Rights).
443. See id. at 236 (noting common approaches across several different areas
of fundamental rights doctrine); see also Volokh, supra note 3, at 1460–61
(noting that adjudications of substantive rights claims often include an inquiry
into the substantiality of the burden that the challenged law imposes on the
claimed right).
444. See Winkler, supra note 27, at 231–32 (discussing the possibility of the
Eighth Amendment as sui generis).
445. See supra Part III.B (considering how the variant doctrinal approaches
in Second Amendment jurisprudence would complicate a court’s congruence and
proportionality review).
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so in recent years with innovations such as the government
speech doctrine. 446 Fourth Amendment doctrine is riddled with
exceptions. 447 Establishment Clause doctrine has long been
criticized for drawing fine distinctions that seem to lack
principled bases. 448
This complexity necessarily translates into Enforcement
Clause inquiries, given Boerne’s insistence that enforcement
legislation meaningfully relate to the court-announced meaning
of the underlying right Congress seeks to vindicate. 449 Indeed,
applying the congruence and proportionality standard to
legislation enforcing such rights will enmesh courts in even more
daunting challenges, as that standard will require application of
an imprecise proportionality test to doctrine that is already
difficult to apply.

446. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (“The government-speech doctrine is relatively new, and
correspondingly imprecise.”); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460,
481 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing the government speech doctrine
as “recently minted”).
447. See Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56
UCLA L. REV. 27, 45 (2008) (discussing the search incident to a lawful arrest
doctrine and asking readers to “[c]ompare this to the rest of Fourth Amendment
law, which is riddled with exceptions, caveats, and uncertainty”).
448. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110–11 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)
For example, a State may lend to parochial school children geography
textbooks that contain maps of the United States, but the State may
not lend maps of the United States for use in geography class. A State
may lend textbooks on American colonial history, but it may not lend
a film on George Washington, or a film projector to show it in history
class. A State may lend classroom workbooks, but may not lend
workbooks in which the parochial school children write, thus
rendering them nonreusable. A State may pay for bus transportation
to religious schools but may not pay for bus transportation from the
parochial school to the public zoo or natural history museum for a
field trip.
(citations omitted).
449. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (creating the
congruency and proportionality standard for § 5 enforcement).
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3. The Challenge of Methodology
Yet the challenge is even more difficult than that. As the
Second Amendment example has illustrated, different
components of particular individual rights doctrines stand in
different relations to the Constitution. 450 To originalists, the
original understanding of the Constitution constitutes pure
constitutional law—that is, the core meaning of the relevant
constitutional text, unmediated by decisional heuristics or
indirect sources of meaning. 451 Other components—for example,
equal protection’s tiered scrutiny structure—are best understood
as such heuristics. 452 Still other components—for example,
empirical inputs into determinations that go into the application
of tests such as strict or intermediate scrutiny—are not
themselves law, even if those inputs (for example, a finding that
no other policy alternative furthers the government’s goal as
effectively) 453 all-but determine the outcome of the constitutional
issue at hand. If the Court wishes to apply congruence and
proportionality in a way that respects Congress’s legitimate role
in vindicating constitutional meaning, then it will have to
determine the constitutional status of each component of the
underlying constitutional rights doctrine at issue in order to
decide how much of a role Congress has in enforcing that
component. 454 The Second Amendment example this Article has
examined illustrates this difficulty, given the different

450. See supra Part III (noting the methodological variety of the various
analytical steps in Second Amendment doctrine).
451. See Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 1189 (discussing originalism as
“regard[ing] the discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time of its
initial adoption as authoritative for purposes of constitutional interpretation in
the present” (citation omitted)).
452. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2716 (2013) (Alito,
J., dissenting) (“The modern tiers of scrutiny . . . are a heuristic to help judges
determine when classifications have that ‘fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation [required by equal protection].’”).
453. See Winkler, supra note 27, at 227 (considering an example that
purported to answer the narrow tailoring question posed by the relevant legal
doctrine).
454. See supra Part III (noting the different constitutional statuses of
different parts of Second Amendment caselaw.).
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constitutional statuses of the particular analytical steps lower
courts have undertaken when deciding gun rights cases. 455
This challenge is particularly salient in light of the rise of
originalist analysis over the last several decades. Proponents of
originalism often argue that one of its merits is that it seeks to
uncover the actual law of the Constitution. 456 The claim that
originalist analysis uncovers the actual law of the Constitution,
when combined with Boerne’s insistence that courts are the
ultimate expositors of that law, 457 necessarily means that
doctrinal decisions grounded on originalist analysis must remain
immune from congressional questioning or countermanding. But
at the other end of the spectrum, doctrinal components that rest
on empirical or social judgments, such as the effectiveness of
alternative means for government to reach its legitimate goals,
must presumably be susceptible to a heavy dose of congressional
input.
VII. Conclusion: The Imperative of a New Approach
The combination of varied doctrinal inputs and different
interpretive methodologies in any given subject-area poses a
serious challenge for congruence and proportionality review. As
this Article has suggested, credible performance of such review
will require courts to parse carefully the individual components of
a given constitutional rights doctrine (such as the right to gun
possession) to determine which components are amenable to
which types of congressional input. 458
455. See supra Part III.A (detailing the difficult doctrinal structure that
defines Second Amendment jurisprudence).
456. Indeed, sophisticated defenders of more recent versions of originalism
explicitly distinguish between (originalist) constitutional “interpretation” and
so-called “constitutional construction,” which is appropriate when the core
meaning of the document runs out before deciding a case. See Lawrence B.
Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. L. REV. 923,
972–90 (2009) (explaining the distinction and applying the distinction in the
context of the Second Amendment).
457. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) (stating the
judiciary’s supreme role in the resolution of cases and controversies).
458. See supra Part V (using the Second Amendment example to suggest
this more nuanced approach to understanding Congress’s enforcement power).
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Without doubt, this task poses an exceptionally difficult
challenge. But that challenge must be addressed, unless the
Court remains content with more simplistic approaches to
congruence and proportionality. 459 Up to now the Court has been
able to make do with such simplistic approaches, in large part
because so many of its enforcement power cases have dealt with
equal protection, which features an ostensibly-simple doctrinal
structure that, at least on its face, is well-suited to translation
into the enforcement power context. 460 As the Second Amendment
example makes clear, 461 however, the Court may well be on the
verge of encountering enforcement power cases where the
underlying right cannot be so easily described. As it encounters
those more difficult cases, it will have to decide how seriously it
wants to take both its insistence on stating constitutional
meaning and its ostensible respect for congressional
determinations that Congress is best-suited to make. The Court’s
decisions will determine its true degree of interest in treating the
national legislature seriously as a partner in the project of
vindicating constitutional meaning.

459. See supra Part II.B (charting the Court’s formulaic approach to
Enforcement Clause cases post-Boerne).
460. See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721
(2003).
461. See supra Part III.B (discussing the intricacies of the Second
Amendment right and the enforcement power).

